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Abstract 
Network traffic classification is the process of associating network applica-
tions with the network traffic they generate, which is a fundamental technique 
of broad interest. The classification decisions can be made based on a variety 
of information carried in the network traffic, such as the port number fields in 
packet headers, the application-layer payload content, and the statistical prop-
erties of the traffic flows. Nonetheless, the state of the art approaches all rely 
on some sort of a priori knowledge, such as the well-known and registered port 
list, protocol specifications, handcrafted protocol signatures, and pre-labelled 
training data sets. Therefore, labour-intensive pre-processing is required and 
the ability to deal with previously unknown applications is limited. 
In this thesis, we attempt to further automate the process of network traffic 
classification by addressing a number of critical problems in both statistics-
based and payload-based approaches. In particular, we focus on the following 
problems. First, we evaluate various schemes to train and test statistics-based 
traffic classifiers from labelled data with respect to unknown traffic, which is 
mostly ignored in previous studies in both classifier designs and evaluation ex-
periments. Second, we provide in-depth study on the problem of statistics-
based traffic clustering, which is the essential technique for automated learning 
from unknown traffic data. In order to derive accurate traffic clusters, we pro-
pose an unsupervised clustering approach based on random forest proximity 
and a semi-supervised approach to incorporate the equivalence relationships 
II 
 
among traffic flows that are extracted according to the background knowledge 
of networking. Third, we propose an approach to automate the process of pro-
tocol signature learning for payload-based traffic classifiers. The proposal fo-
cuses on deriving regular expression signatures from labelled traffic data. The 
automatically derived signatures are similar to the handcrafted ones and they 
can be easily integrated in real-world deep packet inspection systems. 
In our study, the proposed approaches are all evaluated by using real-world 
Internet traffic traces that are either publicly available or collected locally us-
ing high-performance network probes. In the evaluations, we also compare our 
approaches with existing methods proposed in related work. The data sets and 
some source codes used in the thesis will be made available to the research 
community to enable validation and extension of the work. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Network traffic classification is the process of associating network traffic 
flows with the network applications that generate them, which is also called 
application protocol identification or protocol inference. It serves as a founda-
tion for a wide range of activities in networking, from network management to 
network security [1-2], from service differentiation to traffic engineering, from 
trend analysis to network research [3]. 
In this context, the objects to classify are network traffic flows, which consist 
of sequences of network packets exchanged between pairs of endpoints for the 
purpose of inter-process communication over computer networks. The classifi-
cation can be based on different information of the traffic flows, such as port 
numbers, application payloads, and statistical features of the flows.  
In this chapter, we discuss the challenges faced by the current techniques for 
network traffic classification, including port-based, payload-based, and statis-
tics-based approaches. A number of research problems are identified and the 
proposed methods to address the problems are briefly introduced. 
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1.1 Motivations 
Network traffic classification realizes the fine-grained visibility of the type of 
traffic traversing across the networks. It is one of the most essential function-
alities in modern network systems. 
For management purpose, network system administrators are always keen on 
obtaining perspicuous mapping between each network application and its cor-
responding traffic, so as to grasp precise and comprehensive information about 
the applications using their networks. Based on the knowledge, they can en-
force administrative and security policies by imposing a set of fine-grained 
rules regarding the access to specific types of applications, services and content. 
For example, campus or enterprise networks can constrain peer-to-peer (P2P) 
file sharing and gaming traffic so as to reserve network resources for priority 
services or business critical applications. 
Traffic classification is the core module of network security systems including 
Firewalls and Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) such as Snort [1] 
and Bro [2]. For example, it enables dynamic access control in adaptive fire-
walls and application-level security monitoring and auditing in NIDS, which 
helps to detect and prevent abnormal and misuse activities due to malicious 
users, malwares, and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. 
In recent years, ISPs are also being required by the governments to provide 
capabilities of Lawful Interception (LI) of Internet traffic, just like telephone 
companies have to support interception of telephone usage [3]. LI solutions 
rely on network traffic classification techniques to obtain network usage infor-
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mation of any particular individual (person of interest) at any given point in 
time with minimally invasive warrants. 
A precise and ongoing knowledge of how various types of applications are us-
ing the Internet is valuable for a wide range of purposes, including trend anal-
ysis, network planning and provisioning, network device design, and so on. 
1.2 State of the Art and Challenges 
Traditional network traffic classification schemes, including port-based and 
payload-based classifications, rely on direct inspections of the network packets. 
The historical port-based classification scheme inspects the packet headers. 
Specifically, it examines the source and destination port number fields in the 
transport-layer (i.e., TCP and UDP) headers, and identifies the application 
protocols according to the well-known and registered port number list main-
tained by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA [4]). For example, 
port 80 is used for Web traffic (HTTP) and port 21 is used for file transferring 
traffic (FTP). This approach is very efficient as it involves only lightweight 
access to the packets (to the header level) and simple searches through a sort-
ed integer list. 
However, it is widely believed that the port-based classifiers are increasingly 
inaccurate nowadays due to a number of reasons. First, some applications like 
FTP would initiate multiple connections in one communication session, where 
the main control connection uses the default port but the data transfer con-
nections might use an unregistered port chosen through dynamic negotiations. 
Second, some applications may not have a registered port number, especially 
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for some recently emerging applications. Third, some applications might delib-
erately use the well-known ports rather than their default ports, in order to 
bypass firewalls [5]. Similarly, some applications might wrap themselves up by 
using the well-known protocols (e.g. running in HTTP tunnels). Fourth, Net-
work Address Translation (NAT) is widely applied in the current Internet due 
to the shortage of IPv4 addresses. This technique is based on modifications of 
the original port numbers in the packets as they traversing through the NAT 
gateways.  
Some researchers have investigated the inaccuracy of port-based classifiers in 
real world Internet traffic. For instance, Karagiannis et al. [5-6] showed that 
P2P traffic was not decreasing but hidden in non-standard ports; Sen et al. [7] 
observed in their data sets that the default port number for Kazaa protocol 
accounted for less than 31% of its total traffic volume; Moore et al. [8] report-
ed that the byte accuracy of port-based classifiers was lower than 70% in their 
data sets. 
The other traditional scheme inspects the application-layer payload content 
in the packets, which is usually called Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) [9]. With 
access to packet payload content, the classifier can either attempt to decode 
and validate application-layer messages (e.g. the well-known network protocol 
analyser Ethereal/Wireshark [10]) or simply match the payloads against some 
protocol signatures. The latter technique is the standard approach in industry. 
It is widely adopted in both commercial products [11] and open source projects 
such as l7-filter [12] and IPP2P [13]. There are various types of protocol signa-
tures ranging from simple fixed strings to complex regular expressions. 
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The payload-based approach is believed to be the most accurate and reliable 
traffic classification scheme. However, it has some limitations and challenges. 
First of all, the computational overhead of the approach is the major obstacle 
for its application in high speed network links. On one hand, the deep packet 
inspection requires more computational resources so as to extract the payload 
content. On the other hand, the process of protocol decoding or signature 
matching introduces even higher computational complexity. The researchers 
have responded to this challenge by proposing efficient signature matching 
methods [14-20]. Secondly, the acquisition of a priori information about the 
network protocols (e.g., protocol message formats or protocol signatures) is a 
challenging task. In practice, the information is usually derived by network 
professionals through manual analysis of protocol specifications (if available) 
or packet traces, which is time-consuming and requires automation [21-29]. 
Finally, the payload-based approach is not applicable when the access to pay-
load content is unavailable, such as in the case of classifying encrypted traffic. 
Due to the limitations of the traditional schemes, the recent years have seen 
extensive research work on alternative approaches for accurate and efficient 
network traffic classification. In particular, the most promising direction is sta-
tistics-based classification [30][31], which makes use of some statistical proper-
ties of traffic flows. The rationale is that the traffic generated by different 
types of applications exhibits distinguishable characteristics, which represent 
the unique communication behaviours and internal nature of applications. The 
flow characteristics can be expressed as feature vectors and statistical methods 
or Machine Learning (ML) techniques [32][33] can be applied for classification. 
 6 
 
Table 1-1 Comparison of the State of the Art Approaches 
 Port-based Payload-
based 
Statistics-
based 
Accuracy low high high 
Feature Extraction 
Complexity 
low high (DPI) depends on the feature set 
Classification Complexity low high low-moderate 
Handle Encrypted Traffic yes no yes 
A Priori Information port lists signatures labelled data 
Reject Unknown Traffic yes yes to-do 
 
The typical statistics-based traffic classification scheme consists of two sepa-
rate stages. The first stage is offline training, in which a set of training data is 
supplied as input to the learning algorithm and a classifier (e.g. a probabilistic 
model or a classification rule set) is returned. The second stage is classification, 
where the classifier is used to predict the application class of testing traffic.  
Depending on whether or not the training data set is labelled, two general 
types of learning methods are applicable in the first stage. Supervised learning 
algorithms are designed to learn a classification model from a labelled training 
data set. In contrast, unsupervised learning (or clustering) algorithms attempt 
to discover internal structures in a set of unlabelled data and break it down 
into clusters according to some notion of similarity. Here the goal is to produce 
pure clusters with respect to the application types, such that the resultant 
clusters can be linked to the actual application classes and the final classifier 
can be built upon them. 
It has been showed that the accuracy rates achieved by supervised statistics-
based traffic classifiers can be as high as payload-based classifiers, and the 
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computational costs are much lower [31]. One of the major challenges for this 
approach is the ability to deal with unknown traffic, as it is well-known that 
machine learning classifiers are incapable of identifying unseen patterns. 
Table 1-1 summarises the main features of the network traffic classification 
techniques discussed in this section. 
1.3 Research Problems and Contributions 
As discussed above, the classification of network traffic can be based on port 
numbers, packet payloads, statistical flow features, and so on. The current ap-
proaches all rely on some sort of a priori knowledge, such as the well-known 
and registered port list, protocol specifications, handcrafted protocol signatures, 
and labelled training data. Therefore, they require the labour-intensive process 
to acquire a priori knowledge of protocols and cannot deal with new applica-
tions automatically.  
In this thesis, we address a number of critical problems in both statistics-
based and payload-based approaches, in order to facilitate the automation of 
network traffic classification. 
x Training and testing of flow statistics-based network traffic classifiers 
with respect to the unknown traffic types. (Chapter 3) 
x Clustering of unknown traffic based on traffic statistics. (Chapter 4 & 5) 
x Automatic protocol signature learning for payload-based traffic classifiers. 
(Chapter 6) 
First, although a variety of supervised learning methods have been applied 
and evaluated for training classifiers from labelled traffic in recent studies [41-
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74], the fundamental requirement of dealing with unknown traffic was largely 
overlooked. It is unclear whether the statistics-based classifiers could achieve 
good performance when they are testing against traffic types that are not pre-
sented in the training data (either because they are newly emerging protocols 
or because not enough samples are available during the training stage). This is 
because previous studies neglected the unknown classes in the design of classi-
fiers and ruled out the unknown traffic in their evaluations.  
Therefore, we firstly present an experimental study on the issue. The goal is 
to explore how and how well we can use the well-established machine learning 
methods to train traffic classifiers that are not only able to classify the target 
classes between each other but also able to identify them out of the rest traffic 
in the background or in the dark. In particular, we investigate both multiclass 
and binary classification schemes in a systematic way. In the latter case, one 
binary classifier is built for each class of interest to decide if a flow belongs to 
that class or not (i.e. one vs. others). Also, we attempt to utilize some algo-
rithm-specific indicators so as to estimate the confidence level of the classifica-
tion decisions, such as the posterior probabilities calculated in Naive Bayes 
models and the purity of the leaf nodes in C4.5 decision tree model [32]. The 
goal is to reject the classification decisions with low confidence level and label 
the corresponding testing samples as unknown. Moreover, we propose to intro-
duce the background traffic into the training data set as an additional class, in 
order to help catch the applications that are either unknown or out of interest. 
Regarding this approach, we develop a leave-one-out scheme for evaluation, 
that is, for each unconcerned protocol we leave it out from the background 
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class in the training set but use it for testing, so as to test whether background 
class is able to catch the traffic types that are unknown at the time of training. 
Second, learning from unknown traffic data is a key building block for auto-
matic network traffic classification. Some classic unsupervised clustering algo-
rithms (e.g. K-Means and EM [33]) have been applied for the task in previous 
works [75-88], but the reported results are far from satisfactory in terms of low 
accuracy. Thus we present a novel approach in this thesis, which performs 
traffic clustering based on Random Forest (RF) [101] proximity instead of Eu-
clidean distances. The approach consists of two steps. In the first step, we de-
rive a proximity measure for each pair of flows by performing a RF classifica-
tion on the original data set and a set of synthetic data. In the next step, we 
perform a K-Medoids clustering to partition the flows into K groups based on 
the proximity matrix. The proposed method is then evaluated and compared 
with the classic clustering algorithms. 
In order to further improve the accuracy of traffic clustering, we develop a 
novel semi-supervised approach. The key idea is described as follows. The traf-
fic clustering procedures are usually carried out in a standard unsupervised 
fashion, in which the learning algorithms only had access to the unlabelled da-
ta points such that the partition decisions were made according to the similar-
ity of the data points solely. However, this is not necessarily the case in the 
real application scenarios, where we do possess some extra side information 
about the unlabelled flows, which could be useful in clustering them. In par-
ticular, we are able to infer that some flow samples are generated by the same 
application by observing the responding endpoint of each flow. For instance, a 
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series of Internet flows visiting a host with IP address 74.125.237.116 
(www.google.com) at TCP port 80 are typically using the same service provid-
ed at that particular endpoint. Note that we do not link the port number with 
any specific protocol (e.g. mapping port 80 to HTTP) but rather associate the 
equivalent flows with each other. In short, given an unlabelled traffic data set, 
the clustering procedure could be not only based on data similarity but also 
guided by the extra deterministic information about some partial equivalence 
relations of the data points. 
Motivated by the above observation, we present a semi-supervised traffic 
clustering scheme so as to take advantage of the side information. Specifically, 
during data pre-processing we extract the equivalence relations of flows, in ad-
dition to the feature vector describing each flow. Accordingly we arrange the 
flow samples into a series of equivalence subsets, each of which consists of 
samples that are belonging to the same class. The extra information can be 
incorporated into the clustering procedure in form of set-based constraints, 
which specify that the samples in each equivalence subset must be placed in 
the same cluster. In order to derive a constrained clustering method, we for-
mulate the problem using the fundamental probabilistic clustering model, i.e. 
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) [33]. In the constrained GMM, the data 
points are drawn independently from a mixture of K component Gaussian den-
sities, while the constraints reveal that the data points in each of the equiva-
lence sets are drawn from the same source component. We show that the max-
imum-likelihood estimates of the Gaussian parameters in the constrained mod-
el could be derived but the estimates of the mixing probabilities have no ana-
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lytical solution. Therefore we propose an approximate method that focuses on 
finding the means by assuming uniform mixing probabilities and identity co-
variance matrices.  
Third, we study the problem of protocol signature learning and propose a 
method to derive regular expression signatures from labelled training data, in 
order to automate the labour-intensive manual process. We focus on deriving 
regular expression signatures because on one hand they provide sufficient flex-
ibility and expressive power to match various protocol-specific features and on 
the other hand they are widely supported by real-world systems (e.g., Snort, 
Bro, l7-filter, and IPP2P) so that the signatures can easily be integrated and 
deployed. In particular, we consider a certain subset of the standard regular 
expression syntax, including position constraints and choice operator, which 
are essential for modelling protocol message formats but were missed by previ-
ous studies of automatic approaches [21-25]. Our algorithm takes a labelled 
training data set as input and produces signatures for matching the applica-
tion protocols presented in the data. It proceeds in four stages: the first stage 
is pre-processing where we extract the application session payload in a novel 
way; the next stage is tokenization, in which we find common substrings and 
incorporate several advanced features such as choice operators and position 
constraints; in the third step of multiple sequence alignment, we progressively 
align the payload byte sequences for each application class, in order to derive 
the common subsequence that matches all the flows from that class; and the 
final stage is signature construction where we transform the common subse-
quences into regular expressions.  
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Table 1-2 Data Sets Used in This Thesis 
Name Description 
Genome [43] 
A processed data set in ARFF format [106], in which 
each line represents a flow and consists of 248 features 
and a class label. The data are collected in 2005 from an 
edge Gigabit Ethernet link of a Genome campus net-
work that hosts several Biology-related institutions and 
facilities. 
Wide-08 and 
Wide-09 
xviii[107]  
Packet trace with partial payload in PCAP format [10], 
collected in 2008 and 2009 at a US-Japan trans-Pacific 
backbone line (150Mbps Ethernet link) that carries 
commodity traffic for WIDE organizations. 
Keio [107] 
Packet trace with partial payload in PCAP file format, 
collected in 2006 from 1Gbps Ethernet link in Keio Uni-
versity’s Shonan-Fujisawa campus in Japan. 
ISP 
Packet trace with full payload in PCAP format, collect-
ed in 2011 from a 100Mbps Ethernet edge link of a local 
Internet Service Provider 
 
All the approaches proposed in the thesis are evaluated by using a variety of 
real-world Internet traffic trace data sets, as listed in Table 1-2, which are ei-
ther publicly available to researchers or collected locally by us.  
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 presents the research background by reviewing related research 
papers in the literature. 
We study the problem of statistics-based network traffic classification using 
Machine Learning techniques from chapter 3 to chapter 5. 
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In particular, chapter 3 evaluates the actual accuracy performance of super-
vised network traffic classification in the presence of unknown testing data. 
Chapter 4 focuses on unsupervised cluster analysis of network traffic, in 
which a novel traffic clustering approach based on Random Forest proximity is 
presented and compared with the traditional approaches. 
Chapter 5 investigates the utility of side information in network traffic, and 
proposes a highly accurate semi-supervised clustering approach that incorpo-
rates the side information in the form of set-based equivalence constraints. 
Chapter 6 moves on to the automatic protocol signature learning problem in 
payload-based traffic classification. We present a novel approach for learning 
regular expression signatures automatically from labelled training data. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the research contributions and findings of the thesis 
as well as identifies several directions for future work. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2 RELATED WORK 
This chapter presents a brief survey of the previous work on network traffic 
classification. 
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2.1 Traditional Approaches 
2.1.1 Port-based Classification 
Port-based traffic classification is integrated in most networking devices and 
software. It was an efficient and effective approach to identify the application 
protocols in use at the early age of the Internet, when the majority of applica-
tions sticked to using their standard port numbers registered with the Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA [4]). Nonetheless, since the rise of peer-
to-peer (P2P) applications that tend to use arbitrary port numbers in order to 
avoid detection and filtering, the port-based approach has been empirically 
proved to become increasingly inaccurate. 
Karagiannis et al. [5] characterized P2P traffic in the packet traces collected 
on the inter-state commercial backbone links between San Jose and Seattle in 
the United States from 2002 to 2003. They proposed heuristics of protocol sig-
natures and block sizes to identify eight popular P2P protocols including 
eDonkey2000, Kazaa, BitTorrent, OpenNap & WinMx, Gnutella, MP2P, 
Soulseek and Direct Connect. Their results indicated a change in the trend of 
port number usage by P2P applications. In August 2002, all the observed pro-
tocols used their well-known ports except for eDonkey2000; but in May 2003, 
about 30% to 70% of traffic from those protocols used arbitrary ports or port 
80 except for BitTorrent and Napster. The study showed that the P2P appli-
cations had been improved to use uniformly distributed random port numbers 
and to allow users to customize the default port number (e.g. set to port 80 to 
avoid filtering by firewalls). 
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Karagiannis et al. [6] extended their P2P traffic identification heuristics by 
combining port number flagging, protocol signature confirmation and P2P host 
association. The techniques were applied to analyse the trend of P2P traffic in 
the backbone traces collected in August 2002, May 2003 and January 2004. 
The results showed that the fraction of P2P traffic continued to increase but 
the use of well-known P2P ports decreased in the contrary. Therefore, the de-
crease of P2P traffic according to port-based measurement was misleading. 
Sen et al. [7] investigated the traffic of five popular P2P protocols including 
BitTorrent, eDonkey, Gnutella, Kazaa, and Direct Connect, based on the pro-
tocol signatures they developed. Their results obtained from an Internet access 
trace and a VPN trace showed that most of BitTorrent and eDonkey traffic is 
running on their registered ports, while a large fraction of the Gnutella (34%), 
Direct Connect (38%) and Kazaa (72%) traffic is using non-standard ports. 
Moore et al. [8] investigated the inaccuracy of port-based traffic classification 
by identifying and quantifying various types of errors. Their study was based 
on a full payload packet trace collected on the edge Gigabit Ethernet link of a 
Genome campus network that hosts several Biology-related institutions and 
facilities. Their traffic identification scheme consisted of nine methods includ-
ing port number analysis, packet header analysis, signature matching in single 
packet payloads, protocol semantics analysis in single packet payloads, signa-
ture matching in the first K-Bytes of flow payloads, protocol semantics analy-
sis in the first K-Bytes of flow payloads, protocol decoding of control flows, 
protocol decoding of all flows, and host history analysis. The results showed 
that port-based classification would not only underestimate the traffic for some 
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classes (e.g., 20% for BULK traffic and 6% for WWW traffic) but also over-
estimate the traffic for some other classes (e.g., about 0.5% for INTERAC-
TIVE traffic). In general, port-based classification correctly identified approx-
imately 70% of the overall traffic in the Genome trace. 
2.1.2 Payload-based Classification 
2.1.2.1Handcrafted Protocol Signatures 
Early research efforts on payload-based traffic classification [9] have been 
dedicated to the construction of protocol signature library and the scalability 
issue of deep packet inspection. On one hand, a number of studies have pre-
sented a range of protocol signatures that were manually derived from availa-
ble protocol specifications or empirical packet trace. On the other hand, the 
computational cost of deep packet inspection is significantly higher than port 
number inspection. Therefore, novel approaches have been proposed for fast 
and efficient protocol signature matching in packet payloads, which sought to 
enable payload-based traffic classification in high speed network links. 
As mentioned in the previous section, payload-based approaches have been 
applied to show the inaccuracy of port-based classification. In particular, Sen 
et al. [7] developed protocol signatures for five P2P applications including 
BitTorrent, eDonkey, Gnutella, Kazaa, and Direct Connect, which were based 
on the manual analysis of both available protocol specifications and collected 
packet traces. The signatures were designed to match against the very first 
few packets in TCP connections and they were in the form of fixed strings in 
either fixed or variable positions within TCP packet payloads. The authors 
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used two packet traces to test the signatures, which generated rare false posi-
tive errors (identifying non-P2P traffic as P2P) and less than 10% false nega-
tive errors (identifying P2P traffic as non-P2P). As part of their heuristics for 
identifying P2P traffic, Karagiannis et al. [5-6] derived a set of byte string sig-
natures for matching both controls packets and data packets of eight popular 
P2P protocols. The strings were designed to match against the first four bytes 
in packet payloads because of the limitation of their packet traces (where 
packets were truncated to 44 bytes in length). As a result, the set of signatures 
might generate relatively high false positive rates (identifying non-P2P traffic 
as P2P). Moore et al. [8] also employed a variety of payload inspection meth-
ods in their scheme, including protocol signature matching and protocol se-
mantics analysis in either single packet payloads or the first K-Bytes of flow 
payloads. The actual protocol signatures or semantics were not presented in 
the paper but the authors stated that well-known protocol signatures were 
firstly used and then new signatures were created by labour-intensive exami-
nation of the unidentified flows. From these studies, we could see that learning 
accurate protocol signatures is not an easy task. The manual process is labour-
intensive and trade-offs have to be made in regards to the data and knowledge 
available to the analysts and the quality of resultant signatures. 
Because of its high compactness and expressibility, regular expression is the 
de facto standard in deep packet inspection. The above-mentioned handcrafted 
protocol signatures including fixed strings in fixed and variable offsets could be 
described by using simple regular expressions. Moreover, it is widely deployed 
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in real-world systems, including the  Cisco IPS [11], Snort IDS [1], Bro IDS [2], 
l7-filter [12], IPP2P [13] and so on. 
The matching of regular expressions is typically implemented by using either 
Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) or Non-deterministic Finite Automata 
(NFA). The two are equivalent in terms of expressibility but different in terms 
of time and space complexity. Consider a regular expression of length n, NFA 
takes linear, i.e. 𝑂(𝑛), time and space to build and takes linear, i.e. 𝑂(𝑛), time 
to process each input byte; DFA takes exponential, i.e. 𝑂(2𝑛), time and space 
to build in the worst case and takes constant, i.e. 𝑂(1), time to process each 
input byte. In other words, DFA is faster than NFA to execute but usually 
takes huge amount of memory to store the automata. 
Kumar et al. [14] proposed a compact representation of DFA called Delayed 
Input DFA (D2FA), which was designed to reduce space requirements of usual 
DFA. The model reduces the significant amount of transitions between states 
by incrementally merging the transitions toward the same state into a “default 
transition”. The substantial memory reduction in D2FA data structure comes 
at the cost of decreasing memory throughput, since each input character might 
require multiple state transitions and thus multiple memory accesses. In order 
to overcome this disadvantage, the authors [15] extended D2FA to Content 
Addressed Delayed Input DFA (CD2FA) with the content addressing method. 
That is, CD2FA uses content labels that consist of selected information about 
successive states to replace the normal state identifiers, so as to skip unneces-
sary memory accesses and increase the speed of matching. 
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Ficara et al. [16] proposed another compact representation of DFA called 
Delta Finite Automata (δFA) with the purposes of reducing memory con-
sumption while retaining the efficiency of single state per character. The model 
reduced the redundancy of state transitions by merging the adjacent states 
that share common transitions and focusing solely on the differences between 
adjacent states. In addition, a new state encoding scheme called Char-State 
compression was integrated with δFA for further reduction of space complexi-
ty at the cost of an insignificant increase of time complexity in the state 
lookup process. 
Yu et al. [17] focused on the optimization of regular expression signatures for 
common network applications. They proposed two rules for rewriting the regu-
lar expressions with some specific features, so as to transform into DFAs that 
are smaller in size. They also proposed a method to select and combine multi-
ple DFAs into a small number of groups in order to allow faster matching. 
Cascarano et al. [18] proposed iNFAnt, a parallel NFA-based regular expres-
sion engine based on Graphical Processing Units (GPUs) and the Compute 
Unified Device Architecture (CUDA). The higher per-byte time complexity in 
matching is counteracted by NFA multistriding in iNFAnt. 
Sidhu and Prasanna [19] proposed a parallel NFA algorithm implemented by 
using programmable logics including both Field-Programmable Gate Arrays 
(FPGAs) and Self-Reconfigurable Gate Arrays (SPGA). Their algorithm takes 
linear time and quadratic space in the length of the regular expression for con-
structing the NFA, and then takes constant time for processing each input 
character. 
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Mitra et al. [20] proposed a FPGA-based acceleration for regular expression 
matching in Snort IDS. Snort employs the Perl Compatible Regular Expres-
sions (PCRE) engine that compiles regular expressions to NFAs in the form of 
opcodes. The proposed method transforms the opcodes into Circuits Hardware 
Description Language (VHDL) code in order to implement the hardware-based 
matching. 
2.1.2.2Automatic Signature Learning 
A number of recent studies have been devoted to automating the labour-
intensive process of protocol signature learning.   
Haffner et al. [21] proposed ACAS, an automated approach for extracting 
applications signatures from traffic payload. The so-called application signa-
tures were actually supervised machine learning classifiers built upon a set of 
labelled training data. The flows were represented by the feature vectors that 
were transformed from the first 64-Byte of flow payload contents. Three learn-
ing algorithms including Naive Bayes, AdaBoost, and Maximum-Entropy were 
applied. According to the reported evaluation results, the overall error rate 
was below 0.51% and the computational overheads were relatively low. Simi-
larly, Ma et al. [22] proposed an automated scheme for unsupervised protocol 
inference from unlabelled data. In particular, three protocol models were pre-
sented to describe the protocol messages. The first two were statistical models: 
product distributions and Markov processes, which focused on the byte distri-
butions in each of the first 64-Byte and the byte transitions in each adjacent 
pair of the first 64-Byte respectively. The last one was Common Substring 
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Graphs (CSGs) that represented the structural properties in the flow payloads. 
Methods were proposed to construct, compare, merge, and score each of the 
models and a cell-based clustering framework was presented for learning and 
classifying. Finamore et al. [23] proposed KISS, an UDP traffic classifier based 
on Chi-Square-like tests of packet payloads. According to the experimental 
results, the averaged true positive rate obtained by KISS could be up to 99.6%. 
We refer to the model-based protocol signatures in these studies as implicit 
protocol signatures, which are not compatible with the current DPI systems 
based on regular expression and thus require standalone classification modules. 
Park et al. [24] proposed the LASER algorithm for extracting application 
signatures from sanitised packet trace, which was based on the pair-wise Long-
est Common Subsequence (LCS) algorithm. Given a set of traffic flows form a 
particular application, LASER first extracted the initial flow payloads and 
then iteratively computed the LCS of pairs of the payload sequences and can-
didate signatures. Each of the resultant signatures was a sequence of multiple 
substrings, which could be transformed into a regular expression by using 
wildcards between substrings. Ye et al. [25] proposed the AutoSig algorithm 
with the same purpose of extracting common subsequence signatures from flow 
payloads. AutoSig generated signatures in three steps. It started with the 
identification of common substrings in the payloads of particular protocols; 
and then it performed a greedy merging to reduce the redundancy of the 
common substrings; it finally built a substring tree in which the nodes corre-
sponded to the common substrings extracted earlier. The key difference with 
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regards to LASER was that AutoSig might obtain multiple signatures for each 
protocol. 
The problem of automatic generation of signatures for detecting worms and 
polymorphic worms has also been well studied. Kim and Karp [26] proposed 
the Autograph system that generated worm signatures in the form of (dstPort, 
ByteSeq) from a suspicious flow pool, where dstPort denoted the destination 
port number and ByteSeq denoted a fixed byte sequence with variable length. 
The ByteSeqs constituting the signatures were the content blocks with highest 
prevalence ranks, that is, the byte sequences occurring most frequently in the 
malicious flows but not in the innocuous flows. Newsome et al. [27] proposed 
the Polygraph system for generating signatures of polymorphic worms, which 
used polymorphism and obfuscation techniques to encode the same source code 
into executable binaries with different payloads. The Polygraph patterns were 
sequences of common substrings capturing the invariant content in all of the 
polymorphic binaries, which realised the actual exploit, such as exploit framing 
and overwrite values. The learning process consisted of token extraction using 
a K-Common Substring (KCS) algorithm and iteration of pair-wise sequence 
alignment using a modified version of the Smith-Waterman algorithm. Li et al. 
[28] proposed the Hamsa system that generated multi-set signatures (token, n) 
for polymorphic worms, in which token denoted common substring and n de-
noted the occurrences of the token in the testing payload. Tang et al. [29] pro-
posed a notion of Simplified Regular Expressions (SRE) for worm signatures. 
A variant of T-coffee Multiple-Sequence-Alignment (MSA) algorithm was used 
to learn the SRE signatures from the malicious flow pool. 
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Worm signatures and general application signatures are fundamentally dif-
ferent. In particular, worm signatures are designed to capture the specific pat-
terns that are invariant in all worm samples, and the training data set used for 
automatic signature generation is usually small in size (e.g. tens or hundreds of 
samples in the above mentioned studies). On the other hand, the signatures 
for application protocols need to cover a variety of unique patterns that may 
appear in the protocol messages, and the training data set needs to be com-
prehensive and thus relatively large in size. Some computationally expensive 
algorithms used in worm signature generation may not be applicable in this 
case. 
2.2 Statistics-based Approaches 
The modelling and characterization of network traffic has been studied for a 
long time since the early age of the Internet. For example, Paxson [34] derived 
analytic traffic models for a number of applications such as SMTP, Telnet, 
and FTP. He defined random variables to describe the empirical measurements 
of TCP connections, such as originator bytes, responder bytes, duration, con-
nection bytes, session bytes, burst bytes; and then he derived the distributions 
in mathematical forms that fitted the random variables best. Claffy et al. [35] 
proposed a parameterizable approach for flow profiling, in which they derived 
a number of flow metrics that were relevant to the application types, including 
flow timeout, traffic aggregation specification, network environment, and usage 
information in transport or application layer. A number of in-depth analysis of 
particular network applications has also been presented in previous studies, 
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including online chat systems [36], online games [37][38], Skype [39], and 
Youtube [40].  
The recent years have seen extensive research on exploring the utility of 
traffic characteristics for the purpose of traffic classification. The process con-
sists of two separate stages. The first stage is to learn a classifier from a set of 
training data and the second stage is to predict the classes of new data using 
the classifier. Depending on whether or not the training data set is labelled, we 
can apply either supervised learning algorithms or unsupervised learning (clus-
tering) algorithms in the first stage. In the following, we discuss the related 
work in two categories accordingly. 
2.2.1 Statistics-based Classification 
Given comprehensive and labelled training data sets, it is straightforward to 
build classifiers using off-the-shelf supervised Machine Learning techniques. A 
variety of learning algorithms have been applied in previous work to accom-
plish the task.  
Roughan et al. [41] derived a statistics-based method of mapping traffic to 
class-of-service for QoS. They focused on classifying the traffic from {dstIP, 
dstPort} aggregates and investigated various traffic statistics including packet-
level (e.g. mean, variance and root mean square of packet size), flow-level (e.g. 
mean and variance of flow duration, data volume, number of packets per flow), 
TCP connection-level behaviours, intra-flow (e.g. the statistics of inter-arrival 
times between packets in flows), and multi-flow (e.g. byte volumes in control 
flows and data flows) features. Two supervised learning algorithms including 
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Linear Discriminant Analysis and Nearest Neighbour were applied for classifi-
cation. Soule et al. [42] proposed a histogram-based BGP-level (Border Gate-
way Protocol) traffic classification method. They used Dirichlet mixture pro-
cesses to model the empirical histograms extracted from the traffic aggregates 
that share the same specific BGP prefix.  
Moore et al. [43] presented a data set for the research of statistics-based traf-
fic classification. They defined a comprehensive traffic feature set that consists 
of 248 characteristics for describing TCP traffic flows. The features included a 
variety of common statistics about packet size, data volumes, and packet in-
ter-arrival time; they also included a large number of TCP-specific measure-
ments, such as statistics about SYN, RST and ACK flags, estimates of round-
trip time, size of segments and the total number of retransmissions. Some of 
the features (e.g., the top ten frequency components in the Fourier transform 
of packet inter-arrival time) were computationally expensive to extract and 
thus might not be feasible for classifications in high speed networks.  
Moore and Zuev [44][45] applied and evaluated Bayesian classification meth-
ods in the data set they described in [43]. In particular, the Naive Bayes algo-
rithm was adopted to train the classifiers and two methods were used to refine 
the classifiers, including the Kernel Estimation in Naive Bayes models and the 
Fast Correlation-Based Filter (FCBF) for feature selection. The experimental 
results showed that the Naive Bayes classifiers could achieve 65% and 95% 
per-flow accuracy without and with the refinements respectively. An addition-
al evaluation on a testing data set collected one year later than the training 
set was conducted to show the temporal stability of the refined classifiers. 
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Auld et al. [46] extended their work by applying and tuning the Bayesian Neu-
ral Network classifiers to improve the accuracy up to 99%. 
Crotti et al. [47][48] proposed the protocol fingerprints for modelling several 
particular early sub-flows features, that is, the packet size, inter packet time, 
and arrival order of the initial packets exchanged in the flows. The fingerprint 
of a particular protocol is the smoothen PDF describing empirical distributions 
of (packet-size, inter-packet-time) pairs for each of the first few packets in the 
flows of the protocol. The matching of the fingerprint against the testing flows 
is based on a simple normalized threshold-based method. The authors derived 
the fingerprints for three protocols including HTTP, SMTP and POP3 in the 
paper, whose hit rates were about 91%, 94%, 94% respectively and false posi-
tive rates were around 6%, 3%, 3% respectively. Crotti et al. also applied the 
protocol fingerprint technique for the detection of HTTP Tunnels in [49]. 
Este et al. [50] applied the one-class Support Vector Machines (SVM) algo-
rithm to train traffic classifiers based solely on the observations of the lengths 
and directions of the first few packets in a flow. For each of the protocols, they 
first trained a SVM classifier using the data from the particular protocol and 
then refined the classifier using the data from other protocols. In addition, a 
multiclass SVM classifier was trained to resolve the conflicts in classification.  
Nguyen et al. [51] focused on the extraction of representative sub-flow statis-
tics for the classification of long-lived interactive flows, where the beginning of 
the flows might be missed and the predictions should be made at any given 
time based on the most recent packets in the flow. They proposed to train the 
classifiers using the traffic features extracted in the sliding windows (down to 
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25 packets length) of the flows. For the situations where only one direction of 
the flows could be observed, Nguyen et al. [52] proposed to incorporate syn-
thetic sub-flows (mirror-imaged replicas of the observed sub-flows) into the 
training data set. Furthermore, Nguyen et al. [53][54] proposed to perform 
clustering of the sub-flows in order to choose the most representative sub-flows 
for training. In these papers, Naive Bayes and C4.5 decision tree algorithms 
were applied for the classification.  
A number of studies have been presented in regard to the identification of 
some particular applications. For example, Schatzmann et al. [55] looked into 
the identification of webmail traffic within HTTPs traffic; But et al. [56], Liu 
et al. [57], Madhukar and Williamson [58] focused on the identification of P2P 
traffic; Zander et al. investigated the classification of multiplayer FPS (First-
Person Shooter) game traffic [59] and multimedia traffic [60]. 
The comparisons and evaluations of various statistics-based traffic classifiers 
have also been widely carried out, with a variety of focuses including learning 
algorithms, traffic features, implementation issues, scalability issues, and so on. 
Williams et al. [61][62] presented performance comparisons of various Machine 
Learning algorithms (e.g. Naive Bayes, Naive Bayes with Kernel Estimation, 
C4.5 decision tree, Bayesian Network, and Naive Bayes Tree) for traffic classi-
fication with focuses on feature selection and run-time performance. Williams 
et al. [63] also presented an evaluation of game traffic classification in particu-
lar. Kim et al. [64] compared statistics-based traffic classifiers with the port-
based classifier and another novel method based on host behaviours (BLINC 
[88]). Lim et al. [65] identified port numbers, lengths of the first few packets 
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and discretization of the features as the three critical sources of discriminative 
power for network traffic classification. Este et al. [66] analysed the stability of 
the information carried by statistical flow features with respect to the time 
and place of observation. Pietrzyk et al. [67][68][69] evaluated the statistics-
based traffic classifiers from the perspective of ADSL service providers, where 
the classifiers were tested with same-site and cross-site data sets. Moreover, 
the authors proposed to use the confidence level outputted by the C4.5 algo-
rithm for mining the traffic that the deep packet inspection tools failed to 
identify. Canini et al. [70], Jiang et al. [71], and Li et al. [72] [73] [74] looked 
into the practical issues of real-time classification in high speed networks. 
We note that previous studies have showed that statistics-based traffic clas-
sifiers are applicable to various monitoring points in the Internet, no matter 
they are inside an autonomous system (AS) or on the border of different ASes. 
But the classifiers are usually site-sensitive ([67]), i.e. a classifier trained with 
data from another site is probably not so accurate for the current site and it 
needs to be retrained with data from the current site.  
2.2.2 Statistics-based Clustering 
Given an unlabelled raw data set, the above mentioned supervised learning 
approach are not directly applicable. In this case, we can use the unsupervised 
learning (or clustering) methods to break the data set down to clusters, where 
the goal is to produce pure clusters with respect to the application types, such 
that the resultant clusters can be linked to actual application classes and the 
final classifier can be built upon them. 
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Clustering techniques have been applied in the context of Internet traffic 
analysis. In [75] Hernandez-Campos et al. proposed using the triplets of (re-
quest data size, response data size, quiet time) for application-level communi-
cation modelling, such that taxonomy of important patterns in the traffic mix 
could be developed using hierarchical clustering methods. Similarly, McGregor 
et al. applied in [76] the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm for clus-
tering packet traces based on a range of flow-level statistical attributes such as 
packet size and inter-arrival statistics, byte count and connection duration. 
The resulted clusters were then visualized and interpreted using radar charts. 
Although the researches were dedicated to the aspects of traffic modelling and 
synthetic traffic generation without regard to classification, their interpreta-
tions showed that the clusters did comprise homogeneous traffic types such as 
web, bulk transfer, peer-to-peer and so on. 
The effectiveness of utilizing the traffic clusters for the purpose of applica-
tion classification has been investigated in later studies. Zander et al. applied 
in [77][78] the AutoClass program that implements a classic probabilistic clus-
tering method based on mixture models and EM approximation. They report-
ed that the produced clusters were in average 86.5% accurate across traces, 
according to the intra-cluster homogeneity metric defined as the percentage of 
flows of the dominating application in the cluster. In [79] Erman et al. took 
one step further by transforming those AutoClass produced clusters to a Near-
est Neighbour classifier and comparing with the Naive Bayes classifier. The 
cluster-based classifier achieved up to 91% classification accuracy on a sepa-
rate testing data set and outperformed its counterpart by about 9%. In [80], 
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the authors continued to make a comparison between three clustering algo-
rithms: K-Means, DBSCAN and AutoClass, where they produced comparable 
results in terms of cluster accuracy but AutoClass took significant longer pro-
cessing time (4.5 hours) than its competitors (1-3 minutes).  
In [81][82], Bernaille et al. proposed an early TCP flow classification ap-
proach based solely on trivial packet level features, i.e. the payload size and 
direction of the first few packets in the flow (down to 4). They applied three 
methods including K-Means, EM clustering in the Euclidean space and Spec-
tral clustering on Hidden Markov Models. They proposed a number of assign-
ment and labelling heuristics to transform the learnt clusters into classifiers, 
which were able to classify known applications with 90% accuracy and identify 
the new ones with a 60% probability. The authors extended their approach to 
classify encrypted applications and reported an accuracy rate over 85% in [83], 
and they also analysed the implementation issues of the system in [84]. 
Erman et al. [85][86] proposed a hybrid clustering approach referred to as 
semi-supervised learning, which fed a large amount of unlabelled flows with a 
few labelled ones to the learning engine. The actual clustering process in their 
scheme was unsupervised (i.e. normal K-Means clustering) and the labels were 
used in the following step for mapping clusters to applications. In particular, 
since the labelled flows would usually spread in the resultant clusters, each of 
the clusters was then labelled according to the majority label within itself. 
This is a practical solution for cluster labelling.  
In summary, the studies reviewed in this subsection have showed that flow 
statistics is a feasible discriminator of application classes.  
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2.3 Other Approaches 
This section presents a brief discussion of other traffic classification schemes 
including host-based, graph-based and hybrid approaches.  
Karagiannis et al. [87] proposed an algorithm to identify P2P traffic based 
on the behaviours of transport layer, e.g. the connection patterns in terms of 
TCP/UDP IP pairs and {IP, port} pairs. The algorithm was built on two heu-
ristics: firstly, the source-destination IP pairs that used both TCP and UDP 
during a period of time were considered to be P2P unless they were running on 
some white list ports; secondly, the {srcIP, srcPort} and {dstIP, dstPort} 
pairs with the equal numbers of distinct IPs and ports during a period of time 
were considered to be P2P. The experimental results showed that the algo-
rithm could identify over 95% of P2P traffic with false positive rates ranging 
from 8% to 12%.  
Karagiannis et al. [88] extended the transport layer behaviour analysis for 
the classification of general applications rather than only P2P traffic, which 
led to the BLINC classifier. BLINC associated hosts with particular applica-
tions according the patterns in three levels: firstly, the social-level behaviour 
(i.e. how the host interact with other hosts); secondly, the functional-level be-
haviour (i.e. whether the host is a service provider, consumer or collaborator); 
lastly, the application-level behaviour in the form of graphlet, which described 
the interactions between specific hosts on particular ports. After the hosts 
were successfully associated with some particular applications, the correspond-
ing traffic flows could be then classified by BLINC. 
 33 
 
Moreover, Iliofotou et al. [89], Rotsos et al. [90] and Sanders et al. [91] pro-
posed some novel approaches based on traffic dispersion graphs, probabilistic 
graphical models, and multi-dimensional piecewise polynomials respectively. 
Dahmouni et al. [92] presented a Markovian signature-based method. 
In short, host-based and graph-based methods reveal interesting properties of 
host behaviours and network traffic dynamics, such that they are valuable for 
traffic analysis. But they are not designed to classify traffic flows directly. 
The most practical solution for accurate network traffic classification in real-
world products is the hybrid approach that integrates all sources of useful in-
formation. For instance, Szabo et al. [93][94] investigated a heuristics based 
system that integrates a variety of classification engines, including port-based, 
statistics-based, connection-pattern-based, payload-based ones. The system can 
achieve very good classification accuracy results as reported. 
Finally, the following studies have provided either some insights or tools for 
the research of network traffic classification. Salgarelli et al. [95] discussed the 
challenges in the comparison of various traffic classification schemes. Erman et 
al. [96] highlighted the importance of byte accuracy measurements besides flow 
accuracy. A number of tools have been proposed to help to build the ground 
truth in the traffic data, such as NeTraMark proposed by Lee et al. [97], GT 
proposed by Gringoli et al. [98], and GTVS proposed by Canini et al. [99]. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3 SUPERVISED CLASSIFIERS 
AGAINST UNKONWN TRAFFIC 
Due to the limitations of traditional port-based and payload-based traffic 
classification approaches, the recent years have seen extensive work on utiliz-
ing machine learning techniques to classify network traffic based on flow and 
packet level characteristics.  
Given a set of labelled training traffic data, the problem is naturally formu-
lated as multiclass supervised classification in most of the related studies, and 
the reported results are very promising in which the machine learning classifi-
ers generally achieved highly accurate predictions. 
However, some critical properties of such classifiers are ignored, of which the 
most critical one is the ability to identify unknown traffic. In this chapter, we 
propose a systematic approach to train and evaluate supervised traffic classifi-
ers that are able to tell apart some new patterns. 
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3.1 Supervised Network Traffic Classification 
3.1.1 Objects, Classes and Features 
In the context of network traffic classification, the objects to classify are 
network flows, which consist of sequences of network packets exchanged be-
tween pairs of endpoints for the purpose of inter-process communication over 
computer networks. In particular, the Internet flows are defined as follows. 
Definition 3-1 
x Unidirectional flow. A unidirectional flow is a sequence of Internet packets 
sharing the same five-tuples that consist of source Internet address, desti-
nation Internet address, source port number, destination port number, and 
transport layer protocol, i.e. {srcIP, dstIP, srcPort, dstPort, Protocol}. 
Definition 3-2 
x Bidirectional flow (or simply flow). A flow is a pair of unidirectional flows 
going in the opposite directions between a pair of endpoints, which can be 
identified by their socket addresses {srcIP, srcPort, Protocol} and {dstIP, 
dstPort, Protocol}. 
If the transport layer protocol in use is TCP, then a flow is in essence a TCP 
connection. In practice, we adopt a 900-second timeout for the stateless UDP 
flows that have no explicit tear-down. 
Another essential concept in network traffic classification is the classes of 
traffic. There are a variety of class definitions in this domain, as the network 
traffic could be divided into classes according to various criteria, such as the 
underlying application protocols, networking patterns and so on. For general 
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purpose traffic classification, the two most widely used class definitions are 
specific application protocols (e.g., FTP, HTTP, SMTP) and groups of similar 
applications (e.g., bulk file transferring, web browsing, mailing). In our work, 
the former is referred to as protocol identification and the latter is referred to 
as category classification. We also note that for other specific purposes the 
class definitions could be either simpler (e.g., normal vs. malicious) or more 
complicated (e.g., specific implementations or versions of protocols). 
In statistics-based traffic classification, the flow objects are described by the 
measured values on a predetermined set of features, and then supplied to the 
learning and classifying engines. In other words, each object is represented by 
a feature vector  𝒙 = (𝑥1,… , 𝑥𝑑), which could be regarded as a data point in 
the d-dimensional feature space where d is the number of features.  
The feature set typically consists of some observable packet level and flow 
level characteristics of network flows, which represent the distinctive commu-
nication behaviours and internal nature of network applications. For example, 
in the Genome data set [43] we will use in our experiments, a total number of 
248 features are extracted to characterize the traffic flows, including some 
simple statistics on packet length and inter-packet timings, and a large num-
ber of features that are derived from TCP headers such as SYN and ACK 
flags, estimates of round-trip time, size of TCP segments and the total number 
of retransmissions. In the other data set (see Section 3.3.1), we define a small-
er feature set. Specifically, we measure the number of packets and bytes trans-
ferred in a flow, along with the maximum, minimum, mean and standard de-
viation of packet lengths and inter-arrival time of packets.  
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Table 3-1 Simple Traffic Features 
Observation Statistics Number of  
Features 
Packets Number of packets 2 
Bytes Volume of bytes 2 
Packet Size Min., Max., Mean and Std. Dev. 8 
Inter Packet Time Min., Max., Mean and Std. Dev. 8 
Total 20 
 
These statistics are calculated in early sub-flows (the first ten packets) and 
separately in each direction such that there are twenty features in total, which 
is listed in Table 3-1. The reasons for using only simple flow features are two-
fold. On one hand, it has been shown in previous studies [31] that simple fea-
tures have sufficient discriminating power. On the other hand, they introduce 
much lower computational overhead than large feature sets do.  
3.1.2 Supervised Classification Scheme 
The application of supervised Machine Learning techniques is a two-stage 
process. The first stage is training, in which a set of labelled training data is 
supplied as input to the learning algorithm and a classifier is returned. In oth-
er words, the input is data set 𝐷 = {(𝒙𝑖, 𝑐𝑖)}𝑖=1𝑁 , where 𝒙𝑖 = (𝑥1,… , 𝑥𝑑) ∈ ℝ𝑑 
is the feature vector for the object and 𝑐𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 = {𝜔1,… , 𝜔𝑘} is the class label 
of the object (d and k is the number of features and classes respectively). 
Based on the data set, the algorithm derives a classification model (e.g. a 
probabilistic model or a classification rule set), which can be thought of as a 
function that maps the input feature vector to an output class label, i.e. 
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𝐹(𝒙): ℝ𝑑 → 𝐶. The second stage is testing (or online classification), where the 
classifier is used to predict the application class of some new flow objects. 
Most of the supervised Machine Learning algorithms are designed to learn 
binary or multiclass classifiers [32]. Binary (or binomial) classifiers distinguish 
between two classes of objects based on a training set that consists of sample 
objects from both classes. Analogously, multiclass (or multinomial) classifiers 
divide objects into multiple classes according to a training data set that con-
sists of sample objects from all classes. Both types of classifiers are based on 
two assumptions. The first one is that all classes are known beforehand. The 
second one is that sufficient and representative training samples are available 
for each of the classes. In other words, supervised classifiers are incapable of 
telling apart any object from the unknown classes that are not presented in 
the training data set. 
However, identifying unknown types of traffic is exactly one of the critical 
requirements in practical network traffic classification. On one hand, novel ap-
plications and protocols are emerging along with the evolution of the Internet. 
There are always new types of traffic that are not known or not well presented 
at the time of training. On the other hand, even for the existing applications 
and protocols, it is very difficult and expensive to obtain a comprehensive la-
belled training data set that represents every class.  
Therefore, in order to build practical traffic classifiers with supervised Ma-
chine Learning techniques, we need to be very careful with the class definitions 
and the compositions of training data.  
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3.1.3 Problem with Unknown Traffic 
A variety of supervised learning methods have been applied and evaluated in 
previous studies [41-74]. Most of these studies have overlooked the fundamen-
tal requirement of dealing with unknown traffic. On one hand, unknown traffic 
was completely neglected in the design of classifiers, which formulated traffic 
classification as a supervised multiclass classification problem with regard to 
solely the known application classes. Although the resultant classifiers were 
good at telling apart the known classes with each other, they were doomed to 
mistakenly classify any new pattern into one of the known classes. On the oth-
er hand, unknown traffic was ruled out in most evaluations as well, in which 
the classifiers were trained on some data from a limited number of application 
classes and tested against some other samples from exactly the same (known) 
classes. The promising results obtained in these controlled experiments cannot 
reflect the actual performance of the machine learning traffic classifiers in real-
world environment.  
In this part, we briefly review the experimental methodology in some repre-
sentative related studies. Specifically, Table 3-2 lists in details the training and 
testing schemes in terms of the definitions of traffic features and classes, the 
training schemes and the compositions of training and testing data sets, and 
whether they have tested the classifiers on unknown traffic. Note that alt-
hough we focus on the supervised approaches in this chapter, the studies on 
clustering and payload-based methods are also listed in the table for compari-
son.  
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Table 3-2 Training and Testing Schemes in Representative Work 
Work Feature 
Training 
Scheme 
Class  
Definition 
Training 
Class 
Testing 
Class 
Testing on 
Unknown 
Traffic 
Roughan’04 [41] Flow Multiclass 3 Categories; Protocols 3, 7 3, 7 Yes 
Moore’05 [45] Flow Multiclass 10 Categories w/o unknown 10 10 No 
Auld’07 [46] Flow Multiclass 
10 Categories 
w/o unknown 10 10 No 
Kim’08 [64] Various Multiclass 
12 Categories 
incl. unknown 8 8 No 
Pietrzyk’09 [67] Flow Multiclass 
17 Categories 
incl. unknown 12 12 Yes 
Williams’06 [61] Flow Multiclass Protocols 6 6 No 
Este’09 [66] Flow Multiclass Clustering Protocols 8 8 No 
Lim’10 [65] Flow Multiclass Protocols 7 7 No 
Crotti’07 [47] Flow One-class Protocols 3 3+others Yes 
Este’09 [50] Flow One-class Protocols 6 6+others Yes 
Nguyen’12 [54] Flow Binary Protocols 2 2 No 
Zander’05 [77] Flow Clustering Protocols 8 N/A N/A 
Erman’06 [80] Flow Clustering Protocols 8 / 4 N/A N/A 
Bernaille’06 [82] Flow Clustering Protocols 10 10 + 7 Yes 
Erman’07 [85] Flow Clustering Categories Not clear Not clear Not clear 
Haffner’05 [21] Payload Binary Protocols 7 7 No 
Ma’06 [22] Payload Clustering Protocols >20 >20 Yes 
Finamore’10 [23] Payload Binary Protocols 3 / 4 3 / 4 Yes 
 
Firstly, since there are typically multiple classes in practical traffic classifica-
tion, the task has been naturally formulated into a multiclass supervised learn-
ing problem in most studies. Some of them defined traffic classes as specific 
application protocols, and others focused on classifying traffic into general cat-
egories. In the latter case, different category definitions were adopted by dif-
ferent research groups. Regardless of the differences in the actual definitions, 
most of these studies have not defined any proper class to host the potential 
unknown traffic. The only exceptions are [64] and [67] that included additional 
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categories (the Others and Unknown classes) to represent minority and un-
known protocols, but they were excluded in the following experiments.  
In other words, all these studies assumed that the classes they defined were 
all-inclusive and any future traffic would fit in one of the classes. However, in 
their evaluations the training classes were not all-inclusive in actual and the 
traffic beyond scope was simply ruled out from the testing set. Promising re-
sults yielded in this way have concealed the fact that the classifiers were inca-
pable of dealing with any unknown traffic. 
Secondly, the other types of classifiers (i.e. binary and one-class) have re-
ceived little attention. In [47], protocol fingerprints (one-class classifiers in es-
sence) were trained for HTTP, SMTP and POP3, and then tested against oth-
er protocols. In [54], Naive Bayes and C4.5 algorithms were used to train bina-
ry classifiers for identifying the traffic of an online game (ET) and VoIP out of 
other protocols. In [50], the authors trained one-class SVMs for each target 
protocols, along with an additional multiclass SVM for resolving decision con-
flicts. The SVMs were trained and refined with the traffic from the target pro-
tocols, and tested against both the target protocols and some other protocols 
that were not in the training set. 
Thirdly, only a few studies have tested the classifiers against unknown traffic 
for different purposes. In [47] and [50], traffic of unknown protocols was used 
to test those one-class classifiers. In [41], the authors focused on the recall of 
missing protocols within some categories. They trained a three-class classifier 
for the categories of interactive, streaming and bulk-data with representative 
protocols of Telnet, Realmedia and FTP-data respectively, and tested whether 
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the classifier was able to classify the unseen protocol rsync into the bulk-data 
class. The statistics-based classifiers were used in an interesting way in [67] for 
mining the traffic that cannot be identified by DPI tools, which could belong 
to one of the known protocols (but missed by a DPI tool) or an unknown pro-
tocol. To do this, they utilized an internal indicator of the C4.5 decision trees, 
i.e. the confidence level of each prediction, and decided to believe those predic-
tions with a confidence level beyond 95%. 
In summary, despite the large amount of research work in the literature, it is 
still not clear whether we can use the well-established supervised Machine 
Learning techniques to train a traffic classifier that is not only able to classify 
the classes of interest between each other but also able to identify them out of 
the rest in the background traffic and even unknown traffic.  
3.2 Practical Training and Testing Schemes 
In the rest of this chapter, we provide some insight into the problem by con-
ducting a systematic evaluation of supervised traffic classifiers. We consider 
both protocol identification and application category classification in realistic 
scenarios, where the classifiers face new types of traffic that are not presented 
in the training data sets. Regarding protocol identification, the goal is to iden-
tify a number of target protocols between each other and out of the rest traffic 
(either known protocols out of interests or unknown protocols). For category 
classification, we focus on the incomplete training data case. As an example, 
suppose we only have SMTP and POP3 training data to represent the MAIL 
class, then we test if the resultant classifiers recognize IMAP data to the class. 
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3.2.1 Training Schemes 
We consider a number of possible schemes for training traffic classifiers using 
the existing supervised learning techniques. Both multiclass classifiers and bi-
nary classifiers are investigated. In order to deal with unknown classes, the 
class definition must be all-inclusive. That is, for any possible traffic (even un-
known and unconcerned traffic), there should always be a proper class for it 
otherwise the unwanted traffic can only be mistakenly put into one of the clas-
ses of interest. 
In multiclass classification models, we can define a background class to hold 
all the unconcerned and unknown protocols, in addition to the classes repre-
senting each of the target protocols. For example, suppose that we wish to 
identify the traffic of three target protocols: HTTP, SMTP, and FTP, and 
then we should define four classes as HTTP, SMTP, FTP, and Background. 
The challenge here is how to derive representative training data for this addi-
tional class. A straightforward approach is to take advantages of all available 
traffic data samples from the unconcerned protocols and use them to represent 
the Background class. 
Alternatively, we can train a series of binary classification models. Each of 
them represents a target protocol in a one-vs.-rest fashion, which acts like a 
statistical signature to match if a flow belongs to a particular protocol or not. 
For example, we can train binary classifiers as HTTP vs. non-HTTP, SMTP 
vs. non-SMTP, and FTP vs. non-FTP. In this case, a testing sample will be 
identified as unknown if it is rejected by all of the binary classifiers. 
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Table 3-3 Training Schemes 
 Use Background Traffic in the Training Data Set? 
No Yes 
Multiclass 
Model 
Type I MULTI Type III MPLUS 
Binary 
Model 
Type II BINARY Type IV BPLUS 
 
In summary, we consider four training schemes as follow (listed in Table 3-3). 
x Type I: MULTI. A multiclass classifier trained with traffic of the target 
protocols solely. 
x Type II: BINARY. A set of binary classifiers trained with traffic of the 
classes of interest only. 
x Type III: MPLUS. A multiclass classifier trained with traffic of the 
target protocols plus some background traffic. 
x Type IV: BPLUS. A set of binary classifiers trained with traffic of the 
target protocols plus some background traffic. 
As reviewed in Section 3.1.3, the MULTI training scheme is widely adopted 
in previous work while BINARY scheme is seldom considered. In addition, we 
incorporate all available background traffic into the training data sets as an 
additional Background class and train multiclass and binary classifiers as 
MPLUS and BPLUS respectively. 
For each of the four training schemes, we evaluate five popular supervised 
learning algorithms that are most commonly used in the previous work, includ-
ing Naive Bayes and its variant with kernel estimation (NB & NBK), Support 
Vector Machines (SVM), C4.5 (C45) and Random Forest (RF) [32][101]. For 
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all the algorithms, we use the implementations provided in WEKA software 
suite [106] with the default parameter settings. 
The MULTI classifiers cannot identify unknown traffic by default, so we also 
attempt to utilize some algorithm-specific indicators along with the classifica-
tion decisions. Specifically, Naive Bayes can output the posterior probabilities 
with respect to each class and C4.5 decision tree can output the confidence 
level based on the purity of the leaf node that the testing sample falls in. The 
goal is to find a threshold between true positive and false positive predictions, 
such that we can identify the unknown traffic by rejecting the predictions with 
low posterior probabilities or confidence level. This is inspired by the previous 
work [67]. 
For application category classification, we simply suppose the class definition 
is all-inclusive and train a multiclass classifier using Type I MULTI scheme. 
Note that if the class definition is not all-inclusive, then other types of training 
schemes are applicable. 
3.2.2 Testing Schemes 
We define three notions regarding the compositions of the training and test-
ing data sets: 
x Class-Of-Interest (COI) represents the target protocols. 
x BackGround Class (BGC) represents all the other protocols that are 
known during training but out of interests. 
x Unknown Class (UNC) represents the protocols that are unknown dur-
ing training. 
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Table 3-4 Testing Schemes for Protocol Identification 
Training 
Schemes 
Training Data Set Testing Data Set 
COI BGC COI UNC 
MULTI 
Target  
protocols 
- 
Target  
protocols 
Other 
protocols BINARY 
MPLUS Other  
protocols – p p BPLUS 
 
For each type of classifiers, the compositions of the training and testing sets 
are given in Figure 3-4. In the first two experiments, a multiclass classifier 
(MULTI) and a number of binary classifiers (BINARY) are trained with data 
of the target protocols (COI) solely. The classifiers are then tested against da-
ta of both target protocols (COI) and the other protocols (UNC) that are un-
known to the classifiers in these cases.  
In order to train MPLUS and BPLUS classifiers, data of the unconcerned 
protocols is included in the training set as a background class (BGC) with the 
leave-one-out scheme. That is, for each of these protocols (e.g. p), we leave its 
data out and use the rest (the other protocols except for p) to form the back-
ground class (BGC) in the training set; and then we use its data in the testing 
set to form the unknown class (UNC). This process is repeated for each of the 
unconcerned protocols in our experiments so as to generate a comprehensive 
result. This scheme is designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the background 
class for catching completely unseen traffic. 
For application category classification, we remove the data of some protocols 
within some categories from the training data set, and then use these ruled-out 
data as unknown traffic for testing the classifier.  
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3.3 Evaluation 
3.3.1 Data Sets 
The experiment in this chapter is carried out in two real-world network traf-
fic data sets. They are collected from different sites on the Internet in 2005 
and 2009, and their sampling points are heterogeneous in terms of link type, 
capacity and the end users. 
The first one is the Genome data set provided by Moore et al. [43]. The au-
thors classified the original full-payload packet trace manually and calculated 
the full flow features defined in their work. The data is provided in ARFF 
format (which is the default file format of WEKA) and is separated into a 
number of entries. Specifically, we use first ten entries provided on their web-
site. Ten application categories are defined in the data set and the flows are 
labelled accordingly. We further identify the application protocols in each cat-
egory based on the default port numbers (Please note that the original catego-
ry labels are based on payloads and some background knowledge of the net-
work.) In the process, we rule out the traffic running on non-standard ports, 
which accounts for less than 1% of flows. Moreover, the Game category is re-
moved because it comprises less than ten flow instances. Table 3-5  gives the 
compositions of the data set. 
The other data set is the Wide traces provided in the public traffic data re-
pository maintained by the MAWI working group [107]. The Wide traces were 
captured at a US-Japan trans-Pacific backbone line (which is a 150Mbps 
Ethernet link) that carries commodity traffic for WIDE organizations. 
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Table 3-5 Compositions of the Genome Data Set 
Category Protocol (Number of Flows) 
WWW HTTP(323460), HTTPS(4232) 
MAIL SMTP(26498), POP3(1649), IMAP(414) 
FTP FTP-Ctrl(3048), FTP-Data(5797), FTP-Pasv(2688) 
DATABASE MySQL(2630) 
SERVICES DNS(2043), IDENT(26) 
MULTIMEDIA DirectPlay(556) 
INTERACTIVE SSH(77), Telnet(33) 
P2P EDonkey2000(524) 
ATTACK port135(1243), port80(458), port1863(24) 
 
The original Wide traces collected as part of the "a Day in the Life of the In-
ternet" project last 72 and 96 hours on 2008/03/18-20 and 2009/03/30-04/02 
respectively. Five-hour subsets for each of the traces are used in our work and 
are merged together to form an aggregated set. Forty-byte of application layer 
payload content are kept in each packet while all IP addresses are anonymized 
in the traces. This allows us to build the ground truth with deep packet in-
spection tools that match regular expression patterns against the partial pack-
et payloads. In our analysis, we focus exclusively on TCP traffic that consti-
tutes the vast majority of the traffic. Also, we consider only the flows that 
have valid TCP handshakes and exclude the flows that start before the obser-
vation time. A 900-second idle timeout is adopted for the flows terminated 
without a proper tear-down. The traffic breakdown of Wide data set is shown 
in Table 3-6, in terms of 18 identified protocols and the unidentified traffic 
either encrypted or unknown. 
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Table 3-6 Traffic Breakdown of the Wide Data Set 
Protocol Flows (%) Packets (%) Bytes (%) 
HTTP 
SSH 
SMTP 
BitTorrent 
DNS 
Razor 
FTP 
POP3 
69.9286 
15.6076 
6.6481 
1.5759 
0.4235 
0.2285 
0.2091 
0.125 
75.5121 
6.8421 
3.0089 
1.6546 
1.278 
0.088 
0.0762 
0.433 
83.1301 
1.1347 
0.8377 
1.5652 
1.0485 
0.0162 
0.0182 
0.3745 
IMAP 
RTSP 
X11 
MSN 
AUTH 
Yahoo! Messenger 
SIP 
MySQL 
IRC 
NNTP 
0.0187 
0.0065 
0.0039 
0.0027 
0.002 
0.0019 
0.0014 
0.0009 
0.0003 
0.0003 
0.1596 
1.4505 
0.0023 
0.0831 
0.0004 
0.0017 
0.0022 
0.0023 
0.0001 
1.343 
0.0978 
1.948 
0.0002 
0.1 
0.0001 
0.0004 
0.0004 
0.0024 
0.0001 
1.8463 
Encrypted & Unknown 5.2151 8.0619 7.8792 
 
Based on the data sets, we choose eight dominant protocols to be the target 
protocols in the following experiments. In the Wide data set, these protocols 
are HTTP, SSH, SMTP, BitTorrent, DNS, Razor, FTP and POP3; while in 
the Genome data set, HTTP, SMTP, POP3, FTP-Ctrl, FTP-Data, MySQL, 
DNS and attack at port 135 are selected. For each target protocols, 1000/2000 
flows in Genome/Wide data set are first randomly sampled (without replace-
ment) for training and then up to 5000 flows are sampled for testing. For 
those background protocols, we simply use all available data in the testings. 
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The Genome data set is used for the evaluation of application category clas-
sification. We remove HTTPS, IMAP, FTP-Pasv, IDENT, Telnet, and 
port1863 from the training set, and use them as unknown traffic in the testing. 
3.3.2 Performance Metrics 
We measure the classification performance using the overall flow accuracy. 
Overall accuracy is the percentage of correctly classified flow instances over 
the total number of instances. We skip the per-class metrics but present the 
raw confusion matrix instead, so as to give a more intuitive and detailed view 
of the results.  
3.3.3 Result and Analysis 
3.3.3.1Protocol Identification  
Figure 3-1 illustrates the overall accuracy results obtained in the Wide data 
set, in which the upper graph gives the accuracy rates achieved on COI testing 
data (target protocols) and the lower graph gives those achieved on UNC test-
ing data (unknown traffic).  
We first look at the multiclass classifiers (Type I MULTI and III MPLUS). 
For Type I MULTI classifiers, the performance of classifying the known classes 
is good. On one hand, the accuracy rates of Naive Bayes (NB and NBK) and 
SVM are relatively low, ranging from 56% to 77%. On the other hand, the de-
cision tree classifiers including C4.5 and random forest achieved accuracy as 
high as 97% and 99%. The results are basically in line with those reported in 
previous evaluation studies [61].  
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Figure 3-1 Overall Accuracy Results in Wide Data Set 
 
The MULTI classifiers are not able to identify unknown traffic, so that all 
the unknown traffic is classified into the known classes. In this case, we meas-
ure the confidence level and posterior probabilities generated by C4.5 and Na-
ive Bayes for both true positive and false positive decisions. However, the at-
tempt to find a threshold between the two is unsuccessful. Specifically, the dis-
tributions of the values for the two indicators with respect to the true and 
false positive predictions are significantly overlapping. We can find an IMAP 
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flow (unknown) being classified to the HTTP class (known) with 100% confi-
dence level and some HTTP flows being classified to be HTTP with only 33% 
confidence level. The result shows that the internal indicators can hardly be 
used to reject the unknown traffic, which is reasonable because they are de-
signed for purpose of identifying known types of data in essence. 
By introducing background traffic to the training set, Type III MPLUS clas-
sifiers are able to identify a few unknown traffic flows to the background class, 
yielding accuracy rates from 6 to 26% on unknown traffic across different algo-
rithms. At the same time, the accuracy rates for classifying the known traffic 
are slightly decreased (less than 0.5%). 
The binary classifiers (Type II BINARY and IV BPLUS) achieve significant-
ly higher accuracy rates on the testing of unknown traffic in the evaluations, 
especially for the decision tree algorithms. Specifically, BINARY RF classifiers 
classify 35% of unknown traffic into the 'others' class. Moreover, by incorpo-
rating background traffic into the training data sets, BPLUS further improves 
the corresponding accuracy to 61%. Regarding the target protocols, RF binary 
classifiers achieve comparable accuracy rates to the multiclass classifiers (up to 
99%). Binary NB and SVM classifiers show very low accuracy rates in the re-
sults, which is due to many classification conflicts, i.e. a flow accepted by more 
than one binary classifier (e.g. both HTTP and FTP classifiers identify a flow 
as belonging to them). Note that we have not implemented any conflict resolve 
scheme but rather report the conflicts in the results. In fact, by training an 
additional multiclass classifier to handle the conflicts in decision, we can boost 
the accuracy of these algorithms to a similar level of RF.  
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Figure 3-2 Confusion Matrix (Wide Data Set, Type I RF Classifier) 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Confusion Matrix (Wide Data Set, Type III RF Classifier) 
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Figure 3-4 Confusion Matrix (Wide Data Set, Type II RF Classifiers) 
 
 
Figure 3-5 Confusion Matrix (Wide Data Set, Type IV RF Clasifiers) 
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Figure 3-2 to Figure 3-5 show the confusion matrix for classification of the 
Wide data set using Random Forest models (the best algorithm in the experi-
ments), which are trained using the four training schemes respectively. 
For MULTI classifier (Figure 3-2), the traffic from the unknown class can 
only be classified into one of the known applications. As an example, the 
MySQL flows are classified as SMTP (16%) and HTTP (84%), and 100% of 
the nntp traffic is classified as BitTorrent. In contrast, BINARY classifiers 
(Figure 3-3) correctly identify 16% of MySQL flows and 92% of nntp flows to 
be others (unknown). Furthermore, we can see that BPLUS classifiers (Figure 
3-5) achieve the best results, in which 87% of MySQL flows and 100% of nntp 
flows are predicted as others.  
Nonetheless, the figures also suggest that some unknown traffic types are dif-
ficult to tell apart from the known ones. For example, most of the RTSP traf-
fic is classified as HTTP, no matter which training scheme is used. This can be 
due to the similarity between the RTSP traffic and some HTTP streaming 
traffic.  
Furthermore, Figure 3-6 presents the overall accuracy results achieved in the 
Genome data set, which shows similar patterns as the results obtained in the 
Wide data set.  
In general, the experimental results show that by training binary classifiers 
and incorporating background traffic we can use the well-established machine 
learning algorithms to build traffic classifiers with the ability to resist un-
known traffic to some extent (up to 60%). 
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Figure 3-6 Overall Accuracy Results in Genome Data Set 
 
3.3.3.2Category Classification in Genome Data Set 
Figure 3-7 presents the results for the category classification in the form of 
confusion matrix. As shown in the figure, for the seen protocols within the cat-
egories the recall rates range from 84.6% (WWW) to 100% (SERVICES); 
while for those unseen protocols, the recall rates are quite low. For example, 
63.8% of HTTPS flows have been classified into WWW category, which is the 
highest recall rate across all the categories. 
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Figure 3-7 Confusion Matrix  
(Category Classification in Genome Data Set) 
 
Some categories cannot recognize any unseen traffic that should belong to 
them, such as INTERACTIVE (regarding Telnet). In general, the overall flow 
accuracy for the seen protocols presented in the training data is 95.1%, while 
that for the unseen protocols is only 51.2%.  
As noted in an early work [41], the definition of traffic categories should be a 
research topic itself. Different definitions would lead to different classification 
performance, and thus might require re-design of features and classifiers. 
3.3.4 Discussions 
The main goal in this experimental study is to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the supervised learning traffic classifiers under thorough considerations of un-
known traffic. The experimental result reported in this chapter is obtained 
based on fundamental training procedures and we note that a variety of im-
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provements can be applied, including feature processing, parameter tuning for 
algorithms and so on.  
Regarding flow features, we have done some experiments with reduced fea-
ture set automatically selected by some feature selection algorithms including 
consistency-based subset search (CON), correlation-based feature selection 
(CFS), Chi-squared ranking (CHI) and gain ratio ranking (GR). The results 
are in line with the findings of some previous work. First, feature selection sig-
nificantly improves the accuracy rate of the weaker algorithms such as Naive 
Bayes, but slightly decreases the performance of the better classifiers such as 
C4.5 decision tree and Random Forest. The reason behind is that the latter 
algorithms have already embedded some implicit feature selection scheme dur-
ing the training process. Second, the same effect applies to both known and 
unknown traffic classification. Moreover, similar impacts could be observed for 
feature discretization.  
It is possible to improve the classifiers by fine-tuning of the algorithm pa-
rameters. The results reported in this chapter are all obtained with default 
parameter setting in WEKA. We find that the performance of SVM is signifi-
cant lower than expectation, as it has been reported as a very accurate classi-
fier in previous work [64]. The low performance is possibly due to the selec-
tions of parameters and implementations. Besides, the best classifier in our 
work, i.e. Random Forest, is trained with ten trees. Better classification results 
might be achieved with increased number of trees in the forest, which would 
also introduce more computation overheads and thus decrease the efficiency to 
some extent.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we evaluate the supervised network traffic classifiers with 
realistic experimental settings, in which the classifiers will face unknown traffic 
types that they have never seen in the training process. We have trained both 
multiclass and binary classifiers using off-the-shelf machine learning algorithms 
and tested them in a systematic way. We have also proposed to include the 
available background traffic in the training data set as an additional back-
ground class so as to help to catch the unknown traffic. 
It has been showed in the experiments that the traffic classifiers built upon 
various training schemes are very accurate in telling apart the traffic from the 
known classes, which is in line with the results reported in previous studies. 
However, in the testing against unknown traffic, binary classifiers are able to 
identify from 50% to 60% of the unknown traffic while multiclass classifiers are 
tend to misclassify the unknown traffic as one of the known classes without 
any indication. 
In the following chapters, we move on to the problem of traffic clustering, 
which is a more suitable technique to handle unknown types of traffic. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4 UNSUPERVISED NETWORK 
TRAFFIC CLUSTERING 
Given a set of unlabelled traffic data, or a mixed data set that consists of a 
large number of labelled flows samples and a small amount of unlabelled flow 
samples, clustering techniques can be applied to divide the flows into a num-
ber of groups according to some notion of similarity in statistical features. 
Clustering techniques are important for traffic classification because in prac-
tice it is very difficult and labour intensive to obtain a completely labelled da-
ta set for training. Moreover, clustering has the potential to discover new pat-
terns that might represent previously unknown applications or changes in 
trend. 
However, learning from unlabelled data is a difficult task. Some classic algo-
rithms have been applied and evaluated for network traffic clustering in previ-
ous studies, and the results were not satisfactory as the accuracy of the result-
ant clusters were relatively low.  
In this chapter, a novel network traffic clustering approach based on Ran-
dom Forest (RF) proximity is presented and compared with previous methods 
on a number of real-world traffic traces. 
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4.1 Network Traffic Clustering 
In network traffic clustering, we adopt the same definitions of flow objects, 
traffic features and application classes as in Chapter 3. In particular, the flows 
are defined as bidirectional sequences of network packets exchanged between 
pairs of endpoints, which can be identified using the 5-tuple of {srcIP, dstIP, 
srcPort, dstPort, Protocol}. Regarding traffic feature set, we adopt the simple 
features defined in Table 3-1. Lastly, we focus on clustering the traffic flows 
into specific application protocols. 
Figure 4-1 depicts the system framework of training classifiers from traced 
Internet traffic using clustering techniques. First of all, the collected traffic in 
the form of network packets is aggregated into network flows based on the 5-
tuple flow identifier. To allow clustering, each flow object is described by its 
measured values on a predetermined set of features, i.e. a point 𝒙 =
(𝑥1,… , 𝑥𝑑) in the d-dimensional feature space where d is the number of fea-
tures. Some pre-processing on the features, such as feature selection and trans-
formation, could also be carried out at this stage. 
To this point, the unlabelled feature vectors could be handled by clustering 
algorithms, which derive partitions on the input data according to some notion 
of distance. Here the goal is to produce pure clusters, in other words it is ideal 
that the flows in each cluster are belonging to one single application. 
Lastly, for the purpose of online classification the traffic clusters need to be 
linked to some actual application classes such that a final classifier can then be 
built from them. Various labelling schemes have been developed in previous 
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work [82][85]. The most straightforward way is to classify a few flows in each 
cluster manually and then label the clusters with the majority labels. Alterna-
tively, we could feed a mixed data set that consists of a large amount of la-
belled flows samples and a small amount of unlabelled flow samples to the 
clustering engine, and thus the labelled samples spread in the resultant clus-
ters could be used to label the clusters. In our work, we focus on investigating 
methods that produce highly pure clusters. So we simply use the ground truth 
and the majority heuristics to label the resultant clusters and calculate the 
overall cluster purity.  
Various classic algorithms have been evaluated for the core clustering proce-
dure, including distance-based and probability-based methods [77][80].  
In distance-based clustering, clusters are represented by a centroid and ob-
jects are assigned to the nearest cluster centroid according to some distance 
metric (e.g. the Euclidean distance). For example, K-Means [33] (as listed in 
Table 4-1) iteratively assigns objects to the cluster with closest mean and it 
converges fast to a local minimum of the sum of squared distances between 
each object and its cluster center.  
In probability-based clustering objects have a certain probability of belong-
ing to each cluster and they are typically assigned to the most probable one. 
The most prominent probability model used for clustering is Gaussian mix-
tures, in which each cluster is represented by a Gaussian distribution whose 
density parameters are fixed but unknown. By utilizing the Expectation–
maximization (EM) algorithm [33], one can randomly initialize the parameters 
and then iteratively optimize them to fit the observed data better. 
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Figure 4-1 Network Traffic Clustering Framework 
 
Table 4-1 K-Means Algorithm 
K-Means(𝒙1,… , 𝒙𝑁,𝐾) 
begin 
initialization set the means 𝝁1, … , 𝝁𝐾 with K random samples 
do 
        assignment classify each sample 𝒙𝑘(𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑁) to cluster l 
                          where 𝑙 = arg min𝑖‖𝒙𝑘 − 𝝁𝑖‖2 
        update re-compute the means 𝝁1,… ,𝝁𝐾 
until no change happens 
return final means 𝝁1,… , 𝝁𝐾 and cluster assignments 
end 
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4.2 Clustering by Random Forest Proximity 
The traditional algorithms applied in previous studies focus on the patterns 
in the Euclidean feature space and assume that all features have the same 
weight such that the contributions to the clustering results are identical. For 
example, the clusters obtained by K-Means are sphere in shape and not robust 
to outliers. In this chapter, we investigate the network traffic clusters that are 
generated using random forest proximity. Clustering based on random forest 
proximity has been successfully applied in biometric research to find meaning-
ful clusters in genomic sequence data [101]. 
Random Forest is one of the popular supervised learning algorithms, which 
has been shown to achieve the best results in the task of traffic classification in 
last chapter. In addition to its high accuracy, random forests have several ad-
vanced features. For example, it gives an unbiased estimate of the generaliza-
tion error during the learning process, and also a proximity measure between 
all pairs of input data points. It is the last feature that allows clustering of the 
input data points. In this section, we briefly review the algorithm and then 
introduce the method to build a random forest from unlabelled data and the 
K-Medoids method for clustering the data based on the proximity matrix. 
4.2.1 Random Forest and RF Proximity 
A random forest is an ensemble of individual classification trees. To classify 
a data point, each tree in the forest predicts a class on its own (also called vot-
ing for a class) and the forest predicts the final class as the one that has most 
votes. To build a forest, we need to specify two basic parameters: the number 
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of trees (n) and the number of variables used for splitting the nodes (m), 
which should be much smaller than the number of input variables.  
To grow each tree, the algorithm firstly constructs the root node by random-
ly sampling N data points with replacement from the training data, where N is 
the size of the training data. Then it iteratively splits the nodes based on m 
variables that are randomly selected out of the input variables, where it uses 
the GINI index as splitting criterion. The trees are grown to be as large as 
possible without any pruning. During the bootstrap sampling process at the 
beginning, about one-third of the data points are left out in the training pro-
cess, which are called out-of-bag (OOB) data. Therefore we can use the OOB 
data to derive an estimate of classification error, which has been proved to be 
unbiased in many tests [101].  
When the forest is built, all of the data can be run down the trees and prox-
imities can be computed for each pair of data points. If two points fall in the 
same leaf node, their proximity is increased by one. At the end, the proximi-
ties are normalized by dividing by the number of trees, and the proximity be-
tween a point and itself is set to be one. In this way, a symmetrized proximity 
matrix P is generated, where each entry lies in the interval of [0, 1]. 
4.2.2 Clustering Based on RF Proximity 
Given a set of unlabelled data, we cannot construct a forest directly. In or-
der to derive the proximity measure in this case, we have to define a synthetic 
classification problem, in which a random forest is built for distinguishing the 
original data from some synthetic data. The final forest and the proximity 
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measure strongly depend on the construction of the synthetic samples. In our 
study, we adopt the original approach proposed by the authors of random for-
est. Specifically, we create a second class of data by sampling at random in 
each dimension according to the empirical univariate distributions of the origi-
nal data. That is, the synthetic class has a distribution of independent random 
variables and each of them follows the same distribution as the corresponding 
variable in the original observations. In essence, the process breaks the de-
pendency structure in the original data. If the misclassification rate in this 
two-class problem is low, it implies that the dependencies between features are 
significant. After the forest is built, we can run the original unlabelled data 
through it and derive the proximity matrix. Moreover, as the name suggested 
a RF model is random and so is the proximity matrix. Therefore, we repeat 
the whole process for a number of times (T, i.e. the number of forests) and 
calculate the averaged proximities to be the final measure.  
The proximity matrix can then be used as an input to any dissimilarity-
based clustering engine. In our work, we use the classic K-Medoids clustering 
algorithm PAM, i.e. Partitioning Around Medoids. Although PAM is a cen-
troid-based method similar to K-Means, it has two main differences. First, it 
chooses data points as cluster centers and minimizes the sum of pairwise dis-
similarities instead of the sum of squared Euclidean distances, thus it is more 
robust to outliers. Second, it allows arbitrary distance measures between data 
points instead of Euclidean distances. 
The complete PAM algorithm is given in Table 4-2. In particular, we use an 
implementation based on the R platform [108] in our experiments. 
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Table 4-2 Partitioning Around Medoids Algorithm 
PAM(𝒙1,… , 𝒙𝑁,𝐾) 
begin 
initialization set the medoids 𝒎1,… , 𝒎𝐾 with  ܭ random samples 
do 
        assignment classify the samples to the most similar medoid 
        update 
            for each medoid 𝒎𝑖 
                for each non-medoid sample 𝒙𝑗 assigned to 𝒎𝑖 
                    if the sum of pairwise proximities from 𝒙𝑗 to other samples 
                       assigned to cluster is larger than that of 𝒎𝑖 
                    then set 𝒙𝑗 as the new medoid of the ith cluster 
until no change happens 
return final medoids 𝒎1,… , 𝒎𝐾 and cluster assignments 
end 
 
Table 4-3 Traffic Traces 
Trace Date / Length Network / Link Type Volume 
Keio 2006-08-06/30 mins campus/edge 16.99 G 
Wide-08 2008-03-18/5 hours organization/backbone 197.2 G 
Wide-09 2009-03-31/5 hours organization/backbone 224.2 G 
 
4.3 Evaluation 
4.3.1 Data Sets 
As listed in Table 4-3, we use three Internet packet traces in the evaluation, 
which are carefully chosen regarding the following aspects. Firstly, they are 
captured from two Internet positions located in different part of the world, 
such that the sampling points are heterogeneous in terms of link type and ca-
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pacity. Secondly, the target networks serve a variety of educational and organ-
izational, which typically generate different usage patterns. Thirdly, the collec-
tion time ranges from 2006 to 2009, covering four recent years in which the 
Internet has grown and evolved rapidly. Lastly, partial packet payload is pre-
served in these anonymized traces. This allows us to build the ground truth 
(i.e. the actual application classes of the traced traffic) with high confidence. 
The traces are acquired from the public traffic data repository maintained 
by the MAWI working group [107]. In particular, the Keio trace is captured at 
a 1Gbps Ethernet link in Keio University’s Shonan-Fujisawa campus in Japan 
and the time of collection is August of 2006. The Wide-08 and Wide-09 traces 
are taken at a US-Japan trans-Pacific backbone (a 150Mbps Ethernet link) 
that carries the commodity traffic of WIDE organizations. The original traces 
collected as part of the 'a Day in the Life of the Internet' project last 72 hours 
on 2008/03/18-2008/03/20 and 96 hours on 2009/03/30-2009/04/02. For each 
of them, we use a 5-hour subset in our work. In the packet traces, forty bytes 
of application layer payload are kept for each packet while all IP addresses are 
anonymized.  
In our analysis, we focus exclusively on the TCP traffic that constitutes the 
vast majority traffic in the observed networks. Also, we consider only the con-
nections with valid TCP handshakes and exclude those started before the ob-
servation time. We adopt a 900-second idle timeout for the flows terminated 
without a proper tear-down.  
In order to establish the ground truth, we develop a deep packet inspection 
tool that matches regular expression patterns against early message keywords. 
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Figure 4-2 Application Breakdown 
 
The flows that cannot be recognized by the patterns are inspected manually 
and classified by combining all sorts of available information, including port 
numbers, connection patterns, and the administrative knowledge about net-
work topologies, firewall rules, internal server deployment. 
Figure 3-1 shows the application breakdown of the traces. We identify four-
teen major applications, including HTTP, BitTorrent, SSH, Razor, POP3 and 
POP3s, FTP, IMAP and IMAPs, DNS, SMTP, MSN, SMB, XMPP, HTTPS, 
SSL. In addition, the OTHERS class consists of the flows from the rest minor 
applications (including DNS, NNTP, RTP, RSTP, RSTP over HTTP, RTMP, 
MSN, AIM, IRC, X11, SMB, XMPP and RDP), and UNKNOWN class repre-
sents the traffic that cannot be recognized. 
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4.3.2 Evaluation Methods 
In the experiments, we extract training sets from the traces using the follow-
ing approach. For each trace, we randomly sample 1000 flows for each of the 
majority applications (those comprise vast majority flows in the traces). In 
order to be fully confident with the ground truth, we exclude encrypted traffic 
in the analysis. In the Keio trace, this sampling rule results in a training set of 
six thousand flows representing BitTorrent, HTTP, IMAP, POP3, Razor and 
SMTP. Similarly, the training sets sampled from the Wide-08 and Wide-09 
traces consist of eight and six application classes respectively. In order to gain 
greater confidence, we repeat the random sampling process for ten times to 
derive ten independent training sets for each trace.  
We compare the proposed RF-based clustering method with two classic algo-
rithms EM and K-Means. All algorithms in consideration take the number of 
clusters (i.e. K) as an input parameter. We run a series of clustering experi-
ments on the data sets using a range of reasonable values from ten to two 
hundred as follows: K = 10, 20,…,90, 100, 200, and report the results as a 
function of K. Moreover, for each setting of K we repeat the clustering proce-
dures for ten times with different initial random seeds. Recall that we have 
sampled ten random data sets from each trace, thus each of the results pre-
sented in the next section is averaged over 100 clustering experiments.  
Regarding the RF clustering specific parameters, we use the following setting 
by default. The number of features randomly selected for splitting each node is 
three (m=3). Besides, the proximity matrix is averaged upon fifty independent 
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random forests (T=50), each of which consists of two thousand trees (n=2000). 
We have also tested with other parameter values, and the results are similar 
thus skipped here due to space limits. 
To assess the resultant clusters, we adopt the majority heuristic to label the 
clusters based on the ground truth. That is, we label each of the clusters with 
the most popular applications presented in it. Let 𝐶 = {𝐶1,… , 𝐶𝐾} be the 
clusters and 𝐴 = {𝐴1,… ,𝐴𝑇 } be the actual application classes. The labelling 
function 𝐿𝑎: 𝐶 → 𝐴 associates a class label to each cluster  
 𝐿𝑎(𝐶) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔max𝐴𝑗∈𝐴 ∑ Θ(𝛼(𝒙𝑖),𝐴𝑗)𝒙𝑖∈𝐶
 (4-1) 
where 𝛼(𝒙) returns the actual application class of the given flow sample 𝒙 and 
𝛩(𝑋,𝑌 ) is defined as  
 𝛩(𝑠, 𝑡) = {1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑠 = 𝑡   0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 (4-2) 
After labelling, we measure the clustering results using both overall accuracy 
and per-class F-measure. First of all, overall flow accuracy (or cluster purity) 
determines the general quality of the resultant clusters. It is calculated as the 
ratio of the number of correctly labelled flows to the total number of flows in 
the clusters.  
We are also interested in per-class performance. Consider a particular appli-
cation class A, true positive (TP) is the number of A‘s flows that are correctly 
labelled as belonging to it, false negative (FN) is the count of A‘s flows that 
are incorrectly labelled to other classes, and false positive (FP) is the number 
of flows from other application classes that are mistakenly labelled as belong-
ing to A.  
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Accordingly, precision rate and recall rate for class A can be calculated as 
follows.  
 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃  (4-3) 
 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁  (4-4) 
Finally we consider the F-measure, which appreciates a balance between preci-
sion and recall by taking the harmonic mean of the two. 
 F1 = 2 × 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙  (4-5) 
4.3.3 Result and Analysis 
The overall accuracy results of the clustering experiments are illustrated in 
Figure 4-3.  
We first look at the results obtained in the Keio data sets. With the number 
of clusters setting to a small number of ten (i.e., 𝐾 = 10), the overall accuracy 
rates are 46%, 55% and 68% for K-Means, EM and RF clustering respectively. 
The accuracy rates are relatively low, which indicates that a small number of 
clusters may not model the data well. The accuracy rates for all the algorithms 
climbs rapidly as the number of clusters increases. The trend continues until 
the value of K reaches 100, where the K-Means and EM clusters are 69% and 
85% in terms of purity and the RF clustering achieves a purity level of 90%. 
Then the trends of improvement with increase of K for all algorithms become 
more gradual even if K keeps increasing by a hundred. Finally, when K equals 
to the maximum value in consideration (i.e. 𝐾 = 200), K-Means, EM and RF 
clustering produce 72%, 88% and 93% accurate clusters respectively. 
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Figure 4-3 Overall Accuracy Results 
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Figure 4-4 Per-class F-Measure Results 
 
In comparison, RF clustering outperforms K-Means and EM by 14%-21% 
and 5%-22% respectively in terms of accuracy over different values of K in the 
Keio data set. Similar situations can be observed in the other two data sets. In 
Wide-08 data sets, RF clustering is 6%-20% and 2%-13% more accurate than 
K-Means and EM across different values of K. In Wide-09 data sets, the corre-
sponding measures are 17%-20% and 7%-10%.  
One of the advantages of RF clustering is that it achieves higher accuracy 
with smaller number of clusters. As an example, take 85% accurate as a goal, 
RF clustering can reach it with only K=100 in Wide-08 data set and K=50 in 
others, while its best competitor EM requires K being 200 and 100 respectively.  
Figure 4-4 gives the per-class performance in terms of averaged F-measure 
obtained in the clustering of Wide-09 traffic with K equals to 50. We can see 
 75 
 
that RF clustering achieves the best F-Measure results for all application clas-
ses except for HTTP. In particular, the F-Measure is 100% for DNS, 68% for 
HTTP and 80%-90% for the others. The per-class performance in other exper-
iments is not presented here due to space limitations, but we note that compa-
rable results can be found. 
In order to provide further insights of the resultant traffic clusters produced 
by the different algorithms, we interpret the cluster compositions by visualiz-
ing the distribution of protocols across clusters in terms of both flow number 
and percentage. Figure 4-5 depicts the clusters generated in an example exper-
iment in the Wide-09 data set with K=50 by K-Means, EM and RF clustering 
respectively. The clusters are sorted by size with the largest cluster on the left 
most. Note that in the procedure of clustering, some centers without any as-
signed data point are deleted by default, thus the final number of clusters can 
be less than the pre-defined value. 
We first look at the large clusters. RF clustering has its top ten clusters rep-
resenting all the six protocols with an average accuracy of 89.7%, and they 
cover up to 71% of the whole data. The top ten K-Means clusters stand for 
only five classes (all classes but BitTorrent) with 63% accuracy and cover 72% 
of the data. The top ten EM clusters cover 54% of the total flows with 89% 
accuracy and also have representatives for all six applications.  
The applications with most widely spread patterns are SMTP and Bit-
Torrent. It can be seen that SMTP dominates 20, 11 and 17 clusters in K-
Means, EM and RF clustering respectively, while BitTorrent has 11, 16 and 10 
representative clusters. 
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Figure 4-5 Cluster Composition (Wide-09 Data Set, K=50) 
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4.3.4 Discussions 
In practice the actual number of clusters is unknown in advance and there is 
a trade-off in the choice of an appropriate value. On one hand, it is widely be-
lieved [77][80][82] that some application classes should have multiple repre-
sentative clusters, because the traffic pattern of one single application can be 
diverse. Take HTTP for example, it is a multi-purpose application protocol 
that can serve a wide range of activities including web browsing, bulk transfer-
ring, media streaming and so on, so we can expect multiple clusters represent-
ing the traffic for every sub-type. On the other hand, an overly large number 
of clusters are undesirable, such as the extreme case of having one cluster per 
object. Although this would seem to boost the clustering accuracy, the result-
ant small clusters are useless. Also, an increasing number of clusters will in-
crease computational cost and decrease run time performance.  
Since we possess the ground truth of our data sets, we can have the number 
of clusters as an adjustable parameter in our experiment and present the re-
sults as a function of its values. From the results given in Figure 4-3, we can 
see that the overall accuracy rates of all the algorithms in consideration tend 
to converge with a moderate value of K. For example, for the Keio data set 
that consists of six thousand flows, the increase of accuracy becomes gradual 
after K reaches a hundred.  
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we propose a novel traffic clustering approach, which is 
based on the Random Forest proximity matrix. The method is evaluated on 
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real-world Internet traces and compared with the classic clustering algorithms. 
The results show that the proposed method outperforms the classic clustering 
algorithms for traffic clustering in terms of both overall accuracy and per-class 
performance. We also present visual interpretations of the clusters generated 
by the different algorithms in consideration. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5 SEMI-SUPERVISED NETWORK 
TRAFFIC CLUSTERING 
In the last chapter, the core clustering procedure was formulated as a stand-
ard unsupervised learning problem, where the clustering algorithm learns from 
the data itself in the absence of any kind of guidance, so that the data samples 
were divided into groups according to some particular notion of similarity or 
dissimilarity solely, such as Euclidean distances and RF proximities.  
Nonetheless, in the particular problem of network traffic clustering, we do 
possess some extra side information, which indicates that some data points are 
belong to the same class even though they are unlabelled. This information 
comes from the background knowledge of Internet traffic, and it can provide 
useful partial guidance to the clusterer. 
Motivated by the observation, we present in this chapter a semi-supervised 
network traffic clustering scheme to take advantage of the side information. In 
particular, the side information is incorporated into the clustering procedure in 
the form of set-based constraints, which specify that the flow samples in each 
equivalence subset must be placed in the same cluster. A novel constrained 
clustering algorithm is proposed accordingly. 
The semi-supervised approach is evaluated and compared with the classic 
unsupervised clustering algorithms on a number of real-world traffic traces. 
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5.1 Side Information in Internet Traffic 
In this chapter, we propose to make use of a particular type of equivalence 
relationship among network flows, which is in the form of "the set of flows {a, 
b, c …} must belong to the same class". This type of side information could be 
efficiently derived by observing the responding endpoint in each flow, without 
knowing any actual class label. 
In TCP/IP model, a node can have multiple endpoints (each with an appli-
cation process behind it) sending and receiving packets simultaneously. It is 
supported by the transport layer, which uses port numbers to provide statisti-
cal multiplexing of application layer data flows on the same node. In other 
words, the nodes deliver incoming packets to the appropriate application pro-
cess based on local port numbers. Therefore, if we observe in the traffic that 
several concurrent flows are carrying packets to the same endpoint on a node 
(i.e. sharing the same 3-tuple of {dstIP, dstPort, Protocol}), then we can know 
that the set of flows are handled by the same application process behind. In 
addition, this rule can apply to not only the concurrent flows but also the suc-
cessive flows to an endpoint, if we assume that the service provided by the 
particular endpoint (and the application process running behind it) is persis-
tent within some period of time. This assumption is typically valid for the In-
ternet because of the port-reuse restriction rule enforced by operating systems, 
in which a local port number will become unavailable for some time after clos-
ing, unless a particular program is bound to it.  
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Therefore, in addition to calculating the statistical features of each IP flow, 
we are able to associate the samples into a series of equivalence sets according 
to the 3-tuple identifiers and the timestamps of the flows. Here we define an 
equivalence set to be a set of data points that are belonging to the same class. 
A data point that cannot be associated with any other point will form an 
equivalence set with size one.   
5.2 Constrained Traffic Clustering Scheme 
5.2.1 Incorporating Side Information 
The side information about the equivalence sets is widely available in real-
world Internet traffic (see section 5.4). Latest research in the machine learning 
literature has shown that such type of side information is very useful in clus-
tering the data [109]. In order to improve the accuracy of traffic clustering, we 
propose a constrained clustering scheme so as to take advantage of the equiva-
lence sets, which is depicted in Figure 5-1. The difference in comparison to 
Figure 4-1 is highlighted in dotted boxes. 
Firstly, during the stage of flow identification, we also identify the equiva-
lence set to which each IP flow belongs. Note that this extra processing can be 
done on the fly without introducing much computational cost. Recall that the 
network packets are aggregated into flows according to the 5-tuple of {srcIP, 
srcPort, dstIP, dstPort, Protocol}, and at the same time the flows can be as-
sociated into equivalence sets according to the 3-tuple of {dstIP, dstPort, Pro-
tocol}.  
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Figure 5-1 Semi-Supervised Network Traffic Clustering Framework 
(Differences to Figure 4-1 are highlighted in dotted shapes) 
 
In the next stage, the equivalence sets could be presented as set-based con-
straints to the clustering procedure. As the name implies, a set-based con-
straint specifies that the particular set of data points must be placed in the 
same cluster.  
Finally, the clustering procedure takes both the unlabelled data samples and 
the set-based constraints as input. It then derives a partition of the data that 
satisfies all the constraints. The traditional unsupervised learning algorithms 
have no way to handle the constraints, thus we have to derive a new con-
strained clustering algorithm. 
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This approach falls in the category of semi-supervised learning. Here the 
semi supervision comes from the set-based constraints instead of class labels. 
The information provided by the constraints is weaker than class labels, or in 
some sense more general, as they reveal only fractional positive relationships 
among the data and not all samples from the same class are linked together in 
this way. Also, there is no further indication about to which class each equiva-
lence set belong. For instance, we can tell that the concurrent IP flows visiting 
{192.168.0.1, 80, TCP} are using the same application but we do not try to 
associate the set with any particular application.  
5.2.2 Traffic Clustering Using Discretised Features  
In addition to the incorporation of side information into the clustering deci-
sion process, we also apply an unsupervised feature discretisation method in 
our scheme.  
Data pre-processing including feature transformation and selection plays an 
important role in machine learning. As discussed in chapter 2, a previous 
study [65] has revealed the importance of data discretisation in supervised 
traffic classification. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate the impact of 
feature discretisation in traffic clustering.  
We adopt a fundamental unsupervised discretisation approach called Equal 
Frequency Binning. Specifically, for each feature we divide the range of the 
observed values into a series of intervals, each of which holds the same number 
of observed samples. The resultant intervals are sequentially numbered and 
the continuous feature values are replaced by the interval numbers.  
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5.3 Constrained Clustering Algorithm 
5.3.1 Problem Definition 
The problem of data clustering with set-based constraints is defined as below. 
The method proposed in this chapter to solve the problem applies to not only 
the network traffic domain but also other practical application domain with 
similar side information.  
Suppose that we are given a set 𝑋 = {𝒙1,… , 𝒙𝑁} of N unlabelled data 
points, which have to be classified into a number of K groups according to 
some notion of similarity. Each data point is described by a d-dimensional fea-
ture vector. In addition, suppose that we are also given some set-based con-
straints, which specify that the points in some subsets of X should be placed in 
the same class.  
5.3.2 Constrained Gaussian Mixture Model 
We begin by formulating the constrained clustering problem using the fun-
damental probabilistic clustering model, i.e. Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM). 
Suppose that the given data samples are drawn independently from a mixture 
of K component Gaussian densities: 
 𝑝(𝒙|𝜽) = ∑𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑖(𝒙|𝜽𝑖)
𝐾
𝑖=1
 (5-1) 
where the mixing probabilities 𝑎1,… , 𝑎𝐾 sum to one and the component densi-
ties are d-dimensional multivariate normal specified by the parameter vector 
𝜽𝑖 that consists of mean vector 𝝁𝑖 and covariance matrix 𝜮𝑖(𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐾): 
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 𝑝𝑖(𝒙|𝜽𝑖) = 𝜙(𝒙|𝝁𝑖, 𝜮𝑖)  = |𝜮𝑖|
−1 2⁄
(2𝜋)𝑑 2⁄ 𝑒−
12(𝑥−𝝁𝑖)𝑇𝜮𝑖−1(𝑥−𝝁𝑖) (5-2) 
In the GMM, the vector of all the fixed but unknown parameters is given by 
𝜽 = (𝜽1,… , 𝜽𝐾, 𝑎1,… , 𝑎𝐾), and the log-likelihood of 𝜽 with respect to the ob-
served data set X is then given by the logarithm of the joint density: 
 log 𝑙(𝜽) ≡ log 𝑝(X|𝜽) = ∑log 𝑝(𝒙𝑛|𝜽)
𝑁
𝑛=1
 (5-3) 
Thus the maximum likelihood parameter estimate  𝜽,̂ i.e. the value of 𝜽 that 
maximizes 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙(𝜃), is given by an appropriate root of the likelihood equation: 
 𝜕 log 𝑝(𝑋|𝜽) 𝜕𝜽⁄ = 0 (5-4) 
In the traditional unsupervised clustering case, the local maxima solutions of 
equation (5-4) could be derived via the EM approach [33]. First, it assumes 
the existence of some hidden data 𝑌 = {𝑦1,… , 𝑦𝑁}  whose values 𝑦𝑖 ∈
{1,… , 𝐾}, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁  denote the source component of each data sample. 
Thus (𝑋, 𝑌 ) = {(𝒙1, 𝑦1),… , (𝒙𝑁, 𝑦𝑁)} is the complete data. As Y is unknown, 
we can assume that it is random and governed by an underlying distribution 
𝑃(𝒚|𝑋, 𝜽𝑔) determined by the observed data and the current parameter esti-
mate 𝜽𝑔. In this way we can iteratively maximize the expectation of complete-
data log-likelihood log 𝑝(𝑋, 𝑌 |𝜽) with respect to the hidden data Y.  
In order to incorporate the equivalence set constraints, we rearrange the 
samples into a series of subsets 𝑋 = {𝑋1,… , 𝑋𝑀} according to the constraints. 
Now we assume the points in each subset 𝑋𝑖 = {𝒙1𝑖 ,… , 𝒙𝑁𝑖𝑖 } are drawn from a 
single component density, i.e. 𝑦1𝑖 = ⋯ = 𝑦𝑁𝑖𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑀), where ∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑀𝑖=1 = 𝑁 . 
With this extra information, the space of values Y can take on becomes: 
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 Ω = {𝑌 ∣(𝑦1𝑖 = ⋯ = 𝑦𝑁𝑖𝑖 ), 𝑖 = 1,… , M} (5-5) 
and the expectation of the complete-data log-likelihood is therefore given by 
 
𝑄(𝜽, 𝜽𝑔) = 𝐸[log 𝑝(𝑋, 𝑌 |𝑌 ∈ Ω, 𝜽) |𝑋, 𝑌 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔] 
= ∑log 𝑝(𝑋,𝒚|𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽) 𝑃 (𝒚|𝑋, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔)
𝒚
 (5-6) 
where 𝜽𝑔 is the current parameter estimate,  is the space of value y can take 
on subject to the side information, and 𝜽 is the new parameters to be opti-
mized so as to increase the expected value Q. 
5.3.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
With the constraints on the unobserved data vector Y, the calculation of 
log-likelihood expectation is different from the unsupervised model [110]. After 
some manipulations (refer to the appendix), we can derive from equation  (5-6) 
the following expression: 
𝑄(𝜽, 𝜽𝑔) = ∑∑𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑠, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔)∑log 𝑝𝑙(𝒙𝑛𝑠 |𝜽𝑙)
𝑁𝑠
𝑛=1
𝐾
𝑙=1
𝑀
𝑠=1
+ ∑∑𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑠, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔)𝑁𝑠 log 𝑎𝑙
𝐾
𝑙=1
𝑀
𝑠=1
− ∑log∑(𝑎𝑙)𝑁𝑠
𝐾
𝑙=1
𝑀
𝑠=1
 
(5-7) 
where 𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑠, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔) ≡ 𝑃(𝑦1𝑠 = 𝑙, … , 𝑦𝑁𝑠𝑠 = 𝑙∣𝑋𝑠, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔) is the posterior 
probability indicating the chance of the sth subset drawing from the lth com-
ponent density given the observed values of 𝑋𝑠, the condition of  and the 
current parameter estimates 𝜽𝑔. 
By taking the derivatives of 𝑄(𝜽, 𝜽𝑔) with respect to the Gaussian parame-
ters (i.e. the mean vector 𝝁𝑙 and the covariance matrix 𝜮𝑙) and setting the 
results to zero, we can obtain the iterative estimates for the parameters:  
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 ?̂?𝑙 = ∑ 𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑙, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽
𝑔) ∑ 𝒙𝑛𝑠𝑁𝑠𝑛=1𝑀𝑠=1
∑ 𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑙, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔) 𝑁𝑠𝑀𝑠=1
 (5-8) 
and 
 ?̂?𝑙 = ∑ 𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑙, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽
𝑔) ∑ (𝒙𝑛𝑠 − ?̂?𝑙)(𝒙𝑛𝑠 − ?̂?𝑙)𝑡𝑁𝑠𝑛=1𝑀𝑠=1
∑ 𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑙, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔) 𝑁𝑠𝑀𝑠=1
 (5-9) 
where the posterior probability can be computed as: 
𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑠, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔) = ∏ [𝑎𝑙
𝑔𝑝𝑙(𝒙𝑛𝑠 |𝜽𝑙𝑔)]𝑁𝑠𝑛=1
∑ ∏ [𝑎𝑗𝑔𝑝𝑗(𝒙𝑛𝑠 ∣𝜽𝑗𝑔)]𝑁𝑠𝑛=1𝐾𝑗=1
 
= |𝜮𝑙
𝑔|−𝑁𝑠2 𝑒∑ [−12(𝒙𝑛𝑠 −𝝁𝑙𝑔)𝑡(𝜮𝑙𝑔)−1(𝒙𝑛𝑠 −𝝁𝑙𝑔)]𝑁𝑠𝑛=1 (𝑎𝑙𝑔)𝑁𝑙
∑ ∣𝜮𝑗𝑔∣−
𝑁𝑠2 𝑒∑ [−12(𝒙𝑛𝑠 −𝝁𝑗𝑔)𝑡(𝜮𝑗𝑔)−1(𝒙𝑛𝑠 −𝝁𝑗𝑔)]𝑁𝑠𝑛=1 (𝑎𝑗𝑔)𝑁𝑙𝐾𝑗=1
 
(5-10) 
However, the derivative of 𝑄(𝜽, 𝜽𝑔) with respect to the mixing probability 𝑎𝑙 
leads to no analytical solution due to the last term in equation (5-7). This 
means we cannot directly estimate the complete parameter vector 𝜽 for the 
mixture model with equivalence constraints. Several workarounds can be 
adopted for this, such as Generalized EM approach and alternative probabilis-
tic models. For example, Shental et al. [110] considered a different data gener-
ation model, in which the equivalence sets (they referred to as chunklets) are 
treated as single data points weighted according to the number of samples in 
them. In our work, we adopt an approximate method, which not only solves 
the problem but also simplifies the computation and accelerates convergence. 
5.3.4 An Approximate Method 
It is well known that K-Means procedure can be regarded as an approximate 
method to find the means for Gaussian mixture densities with uniform mixing 
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probabilities and identity covariance matrices [33]. Here we apply the same 
approximation to the constrained GMM. 
By assuming uniform mixing probabilities (𝑎𝑙 = 1 𝐾⁄ ), and identity covari-
ance matrices (𝜮𝑙 = 𝑰, 𝑙 = 1, . . ,𝐾), we have two changes in the maximum 
likelihood estimation. Firstly, now the only unknown parameter is the Gaussi-
an means (𝝁1,… , 𝝁𝐾). Secondly, the squared Mahalanobis distance in (10), 
that is (𝒙𝑛𝑠 − 𝝁𝑙𝑔)𝑡(𝜮𝑙𝑔)−1(𝒙𝑛𝑠 − 𝝁𝑙𝑔), is reduced to squared Euclidean distance 
‖𝒙𝑛𝑠 − 𝝁𝑙𝑔‖2. Also, it is obvious that the posterior probability 𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑠,Ω, 𝜽𝑔) is 
large when the summation of ∑ ‖𝒙𝑛𝑠 − 𝝁𝑙𝑔‖2𝑁𝑠𝑛=1  is small. So that if we find the 
mean ?̂?𝑚 with the smallest summation to all the samples in 𝑋𝑠, then the pos-
teriors can be approximated as:  
 𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑠, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔) =
⎩{⎨
{⎧1 𝑖𝑓 𝑙 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖 ∑ ‖𝒙𝑛𝑠 − 𝝁𝑖𝑔‖2
𝑁𝑠
𝑛=1
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                             (5-11) 
In this way, the iterative application of equation (5-8) to estimate the mean 
vector leads to a simple K-Means style procedure, which we call Set-Based 
Constrained K-Means (or SBCK for short). The procedure is summarized in 
Table 5-1. 
SBCK takes in a set of unlabelled data samples and the set-based con-
straints, and it returns a partition of the data set that satisfies all the con-
straints. Initially, K samples are randomly selected from the data set to be the 
seed cluster centers. Then it begins the iterative process in which two steps are 
repeated in each round.  
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Table 5-1 Set-Based Constrained K-Means Algorithm 
SBCK(𝒙1,… , 𝒙𝑁,Ω, 𝐾) 
begin 
preparation rearrange 𝒙1,… , 𝒙𝑁 into equivalence sets 𝑋1,… , 𝑋𝑀  
                       according to the given set-based constraints  π 
initialization set the means 𝝁1, … , 𝝁𝐾 with K random samples 
do 
        assignment classify the samples in 𝑋𝑠(𝑠 = 1,… , 𝑀) to cluster l 
                          where 𝑙 = arg min𝑖 ∑ ‖𝒙𝑛𝑠 − 𝝁𝑖‖2𝑁𝑠𝑛=1  
        update re-compute the means 𝝁1, … ,𝝁𝐾 
until no change happens 
return final means 𝝁1,… , 𝝁𝐾 and cluster assignments 
end 
 
The first step is cluster assignment, where SBCK considers each equivalence 
set as a whole. Given a particular equivalence set, it assigns all the samples in 
it to a single cluster, such that the sum of squared Euclidean distances from 
the samples to the cluster center is minimized.  
The other step is cluster update, where each cluster center is updated to be 
the mean of the samples that have been assigned to it. The iteration continues 
between the two steps until there is no change in the cluster assignments.  
The key difference between SBCK and the traditional K-Means lies in the 
cluster assignment step. Specifically, K-Means processes each data point inde-
pendently and by contrast SBCK incorporates the extra set-based constraints 
and handles the equivalent samples as a whole. The benefits of this approach 
are two-folds. Firstly, some samples that are far from their cluster centroids 
are now possible to be grouped into the right clusters in the case that they are 
associated with some other points in the equivalence sets. Secondly, as a con-
 90 
 
sequence the following update of cluster centers (by taking the means of their 
assigned samples) would fit the data observations better.  
Moreover, SBCK maintains comparable run time complexity to normal K-
Means. The initialization stage takes 𝑂(𝐾) time to select K random points to 
be cluster centers, where K is the specified cluster number. And then in each 
iteration round, the cluster assignment step takes 𝑂(𝑁𝐾𝑑) time, where N is 
the number of samples and d is the data dimensionality, while the second step 
takes 𝑂(𝑁𝑑) time to update the cluster centers.  
5.3.4.1Convergence of SBCK 
The SBCK algorithm finds K mean representatives for the observed data 
subject to the equivalence constraints. The cost function is therefore different 
from that of the normal unsupervised K-Means algorithm. Specifically, instead 
of minimizing for every individual data point its distance to the assigned clus-
ter center, SBCK considers each set of the equivalent points 𝑋𝑠 as a whole 
and minimizes the sum of distances from the points to the assigned cluster 
center. The objective function of SBCK algorithm is given in Table 5-2. 
The cluster centers induce a partition of the data set, i.e. 𝑋 = ⋃ 𝐶𝒋𝒋∈𝑇 , in 
which 
 𝐶𝒋 = {𝑋𝑖 ∈ {𝑋𝑠}𝑠=1𝑀 : 𝒋 = arg min𝒍∈𝑇 ∑ ‖𝒙 − 𝒍‖2𝒙∈𝑋𝑖 } (5-12) 
Thus the cost function can also be written as: 
 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐶1,… , 𝐶𝐾, 𝒛1,… , 𝒛𝐾) = ∑ ∑ ∥𝒙 − 𝒛𝑗∥2
𝒙∈𝐶𝒋
𝐾
𝑗=1
 (5-13) 
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Table 5-2 Objective Function of SBCK Algorithm 
SBCK Clustering 
Input: Finite set 𝑋 = {𝑋𝑠}𝑠=1𝑀 ,𝑋𝑠 ⊂ ℝ𝑑; Interger 𝐾 
Output: 𝑇 ⊂ ℝ𝑑 with |𝑇 | = 𝐾 
Goal: Minimize 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑇 ) = ∑ min𝒛∈𝑇 ∑ ‖𝒙 − 𝒛‖2𝒙∈𝑋𝑠𝑀𝑠=1  
 
Now we prove that the SBCK method converges to a local minimum in a fi-
nite number of iterations.  
Lemma 1. During the course of the SBCK algorithm, the cost monotonically 
decreases in each round of iteration. 
Proof. Let 𝐶1(𝑡),… , 𝐶𝐾(𝑡), 𝑧1(𝑡),… , 𝑧𝐾(𝑡) denote the clusters and means at the be-
ginning of the tth iteration of SBCK. 
The first step is cluster re-assignment, in which SBCK assigns each set of 
equivalent data points to the cluster center with the smallest sum of distances 
to them. Therefore the distance sums contributing to the cost decrease: 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐶1(𝑡+1),… ,𝐶𝐾(𝑡+1), 𝑧1(𝑡),… , 𝑧𝐾(𝑡))
≤ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐶1(𝑡),… , 𝐶𝐾(𝑡), 𝑧1(𝑡),… , 𝑧𝐾(𝑡)) 
(5-14) 
In the second step, SBCK updates each cluster center with the new mean 
vector 𝑧𝑗(𝑡+1). It can be shown that this minimizes the cost for the cluster.  
Consider a new representative 𝑧𝑗(𝑡+1) for cluster 𝐶𝑗(𝑡+1), such that the new 
cost is given by: 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐶𝑗(𝑡+1), 𝑧𝑗(𝑡+1)) = ∑ ∥𝒙 − 𝒛𝑗(𝑡+1)∥2𝒙∈𝐶𝑗(𝑡+1)  
= ∑ ∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑧𝑖)2𝑑𝑖=1𝒙∈𝐶𝑗(𝑡+1)  
(5-15) 
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where  𝑥𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖 are the 𝑖𝑡ℎ elements of their respective vectors. By taking the 
partial derivatives of the cost with respect to each dimension and setting them 
to zero: 
 𝜕𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐶𝑗
(𝑡+1), 𝒛𝑗(𝑡+1))
𝜕𝑧𝑖 = ∑ 2(𝑧𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖)𝒙∈𝐶𝑗(𝑡+1) = 0 (5-16) 
we have: 
 𝑧𝑖 = 1∣𝐶𝑗(𝑡+1)∣
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝒙∈𝐶𝑗(𝑡+1)  (5-17) 
Therefore, it is obvious that the cost for 𝐶𝑗(𝑡+1) reaches its minimum if the new 
cluster representative is set to be the mean vector. 
In short, the overall cost is minimized in the second step of SBCK as well: 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐶1(𝑡+1),… , 𝐶𝐾(𝑡+1), 𝒛1(𝑡+1),… , 𝒛𝐾(𝑡+1))
≤ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐶1(𝑡+1),… ,𝐶𝐾(𝑡+1), 𝒛1(𝑡),… , 𝒛𝐾(𝑡)) 
(5-18) 
Ƒ
 
Theorem 2. The SBCK algorithm converges to a local minimum of its cost 
function. 
Proof. Because there is a finite set of possible partitions of the data set, the 
monotonically decreasing cost will eventually arrive at a local minimum. 
Ƒ
 
The empirical results in the following evaluations show that SBCK converges 
in fewer rounds of iterations than K-Means, which could be due to the semi-
supervision provided by the side information. 
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Table 5-3 Traffic Traces 
Trace Date/Length Network/Link Type Volume 
Keio 2006-08-06/30 mins campus/edge 16.99 G 
Wide-08 2008-03-18/5 hours organization/backbone 197.2 G 
Wide-09 2009-03-31/5 hours organization/backbone 224.2 G 
ISP 2010-11-27/7 days ISP/edge 665.7 G 
 
5.4 Analysis of the Side Information  
We evaluate the utility of the background knowledge and the proposed ap-
proach using a number of real-world Internet traffic data sets, which are in-
troduced in this part. A preliminary analysis of the side information in regards 
to its availability, validity and value for clustering is also presented, followed 
by the complete experimental results in the next section. 
5.4.1 Data Sets 
As listed in Table 5-3, we use four Internet packet traces in the evaluation. 
In addition to the Keio, Wide-08, and Wide-09 traces used in Chapter 4, a 
new ISP data set is included.  
The ISP data set is a trace we captured using a passive probe at a 100Mbps 
Ethernet edge link of an Internet Service Provider (ISP) located in Australia. 
Full packet payloads are preserved in the collection without any filtering or 
packet loss. In this network, there are hundreds of regular home users and a 
number of internal servers that host web, mail and name services. The trace is 
7-day-long starting from November 27 of 2010.  
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Figure 5-2 Application Breakdown of Traffic Traces 
 
Similar to Chapter 4, we focus exclusively on the TCP traffic flows with val-
id TCP handshakes. We adopt a 900-second idle timeout for the flows termi-
nated without a proper tear-down. We apply the same timeout to services as 
well. That is, we assume the service provided on an endpoint is persistent un-
less it has been idle for 15 minutes. 
To establish the ground truth in the data sets, we develop a deep packet in-
spection tool that matches regular expression patterns against payloads. Two 
distinct sets of patterns are developed. The first set is designed to match 
against full flow payload (for the ISP trace). For the rest traces in which only 
40 bytes of payload are available in each packet, we tune the second set of 
patterns to match against early message keywords. Fig. 2 illustrates the appli-
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cation breakdown of the traffic traces. We identify 14 major applications as 
shown in the figure. In addition, the OTHERS class consists of the flows from 
the rest minor applications (including NNTP, RTP, RSTP, RSTP over HTTP, 
RTMP, MSN over HTTP, AIM, IRC, X11 and RDP), and the UNKNOWN 
class represents the traffic that cannot be recognized. 
5.4.2 Statistics of Side Information 
Based on the real-world traffic traces, we conduct several investigations on 
the side information in terms of its quantity and distribution.  
The first question to look at is how much side information is available for 
use. We measure this amount by recording the number of flows and services 
across the traces, and observing the average/maximum service size (i.e. the 
number of flows in each service). The statistics are showed in Table 5-4, from 
which we can find that abundant side information exists in all data sets. Tak-
ing Keio data set as an example, it turns out that the 170 thousand flows were 
visiting only less than 9 thousand services. In addition, a large proportion of 
flows (over 96%) are found in correlation with others. In other words only 
about 3000 flows in Keio trace were using a unique service that no one else 
was using at the same time. Also, some equivalence sets are extremely large in 
size (e.g. some endpoints serve more than 10 thousand flows). In general, we 
conclude that the partial correlations among Internet flows are widely availa-
ble in real-world networks. 
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Table 5-4 Statistics of Side Information per Trace 
Trace Flow # 
(5-tuple) 
Service # 
(3-tuple) 
Service Size 
(Avg./Max.) 
Linked 
Flow % 
Keio 170019 8241 20.63/10461 98.1% 
Wide-08 2701771 47607 56.75/89233 98.9 % 
Wide-09 1772781 32539 53.87/105572 98.9 % 
ISP (subset) 165274 11321 14.60/6373 96.8 % 
 
Table 5-5 Statistics of Side Information per Application (Keio Trace) 
Protocol 
Flow # 
 (5-tuple) 
Service # 
(3-tuple) 
Service Size 
(Avg./Max.) 
Linked  
Flow % 
BitTorrent 640 132 4.8/19 95.6% 
HTTP 138296 5584 24.8/10461 98.7% 
IMAP 432 16 27/210 99.3% 
POP3 4439 243 18.3/988 98.9% 
Razor 1021 3 340.3/945 100% 
SMTP 23172 1604 14.4/6247 95.6% 
Others 2019 659 3.1/124 83.4% 
 
It is also interesting to look at the distribution of side information across 
various Internet applications. Table 5-5 lists the statistics obtained in the Keio 
trace and Figure 5-3 shows the corresponding empirical cumulative distribu-
tion of the equivalence set size. Significant difference across the major proto-
cols can be noticed.  
First, all the RAZOR flows observed in Keio university network were con-
necting to only 3 endpoints, which could be the servers providing regular up-
dates for the spam filtering client applications. Moreover, we can see in the 
graph that more than 900 of the flows fall in one of the equivalence set (which 
could be the major server) and the other two sets hold only dozens of flows.  
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Figure 5-3 Empirical Cumulative Distribution of Equivalence Sets 
 
Second, the two dominant protocols in the network, that is HTTP and 
SMTP, show similar patterns. They have large equivalence sets that comprise 
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thousands of flows, and they also have a lot of flows visiting some unique ser-
vices such that forming a lot of sets with only one sample. The other two tra-
ditional protocols, i.e. IMAP and POP3, have less traffic going through in the 
network, but the equivalence set patterns are actually quite similar to HTTP 
and SMTP as the average service sizes are moderate (range from 14 to 27).  
Finally, the peer-to-peer protocol BitTorrent shows quite a different behav-
iour, as its traffic spreads widely to a lot of peers and each peer typically re-
sponds to a limited number of flows. This is in line with the nature of the ap-
plication. 
Similar distribution patterns could be found in the other traces as well. We 
conclude that the forming of the equivalence sets is closely related to the 
communication patterns and behaviours of the network applications, which 
makes such information valuable for the purpose of protocol identification. 
5.4.3 Validity and Utility of Side Information 
Another critical issue is the validity of the assumption on endpoint service 
persistence. With the ground truth it can be empirically validated that if the 
successive traffic (subject to the 900-second idle timeout) towards a single 
endpoint is indeed belonging to the same application. The results show that 
the assumption is valid except for few situations in which we identify more 
than one protocol in the equivalence sets. The first case is related to encryp-
tion, where the endpoints support both plaintext and encrypted services for 
applications like HTTP, POP3 and SMTP. Thus, we identify both plaintext 
protocols and SSL/TLS protocols in these equivalence sets.  
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Figure 5-4 Inconsistency Result 
 
Another exception is HTTP tunnels, where the endpoints handle both 
standard HTTP protocol and underlying protocol. For instance, we observe 
RTSP and MSN running over HTTP in our traces. Although multiple proto-
cols are used in these exceptions, the underlying applications are actually the 
same. Finally, we notice some equivalence sets caused by proxy servers. In 
practice, proxy servers are easy to identify and usually handled separately in 
traffic classification systems. In our analysis, we remove the constraints on 
proxy traffic and treat the related flows as individual data points. 
Our last analysis of side information focuses on its utility for traffic cluster-
ing. Specifically, we investigate whether the unsupervised clustering algorithms 
can learn the knowledge by themselves, or in other words, whether the cluster-
ing results are compatible with the side information. To obtain quantitative 
measurements we use a metric called inconsistency [109]. Given a data set, we 
first present the equivalence sets as pair-wise must-link constraints. For exam-
ple, an equivalence set containing four flows {a, b, c, d} equals to six pair-wise 
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must-links {ab}, {ac}, {ad}, {bc}, {bd}, {cd}. Then we generate partitions on 
the data set using classic clustering algorithms including K-Means and EM, 
and calculate the fraction of the unsatisfied pair-wise constraints (e.g. flow a 
and b are placed in different clusters).  
Figure 5-4 presents the corresponding results, which are obtained using a 
number of randomly sampled training data sets. We can see that both K-
Means and EM partitions show significant conflict against the side information. 
In particular, when we partition the data into ten clusters, 30% to 50% of the 
must-link pairs of flows end up in different clusters, and the figure goes up to 
50%-75% with a larger number of clusters (K=100). These results lead to a 
conclusion that the background knowledge can provide extra information, 
which cannot be completely leant from the data itself by the unsupervised 
clustering algorithms.  
5.5 Evaluation 
5.5.1 Evaluating Methodology 
To evaluate the constrained clustering algorithm, we use the same sampling 
scheme as described in the last chapter (Section 4.3.2) to extract the training 
data sets. For the new ISP trace, we obtain a training set of eleven thousand 
flows representing the applications of HTTP, BitTorrent, DNS, FTP, IMAP, 
MSN, POP3, SMB, SMTP, SSH and XMPP.  
Similarly, we run a series of clustering on the training data using a range of 
values from ten to five hundred as follows: K=10, 20,…, 100, 200,…, 500. For 
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each setting, we repeat the clustering for ten times with different random seeds 
and report the results averaged over 100 runs.  
Regarding feature discretization we can set the number of samples each in-
terval holds. In the experiments, we find that different values range from 50 to 
200 make not much difference with respect to clustering accuracy. Therefore 
we first present the results based on the setting of 50 samples per interval. 
Full results are given afterwards. 
To assess the clustering results, we adopt the majority heuristic to label the 
clusters based on the ground truth, just as in the last chapter (equation 4-1 
and 4-2). After labelling, we measure the clustering results using both overall 
accuracy and per-class F-measure defined in equation 4-5. 
5.5.2 Result and Analysis 
Figure 5-5 illustrates the overall accuracy results of the experiments. We 
first look at the clusters found in the continuous feature space. In all four data 
sets, with the number of clusters setting to a small value of 10, the overall ac-
curacy rate is 45%-55%, 41%-61% and 55%-71% for K-Means, EM and SBCK 
respectively. The average accuracy for all algorithms rapidly climbs as K in-
creases. This trend continues until K reaches 100, where the accuracy rate ob-
tained by K-Means and EM is 64%-73% and 79%-85% across traces and that 
achieved by SBCK is 85%-91%. After this point, the improvement of accuracy 
for all algorithms becomes more gradual even if K keeps increasing by hun-
dreds. Finally, when the number of clusters is 500, K-means, EM and SBCK 
derive 73%-81%, 90%-93% and 94%-97% accurate clusters respectively. In gen-
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eral, the results indicate that by incorporating the equivalence set constraints, 
SBCK outperforms the unsupervised K-Means and EM algorithms up to 21% 
and 6% in terms of overall cluster accuracy.  
The clustering results obtained in the discrete feature space are also present-
ed in Figure 5-5, which show that feature discretization does improve flow 
clustering performance. For K-Means with K=100 the discrete features outper-
form continuous ones by 6% in terms of overall accuracy in ISP data set and 
between 13% and 18% in other training sets. Regarding EM and SBCK, the 
improvements are 3%-5% and 2%-7% across all data sets. The stimulation by 
feature discretization is less significant when K becomes larger. Take K=500 
as an example, the increased accuracy rate for K-Means reduces to 4%-15% 
and that for the other two is 1%-2%. 
The improvement in accuracy indicates that the side information does pro-
vide useful guidance to the clustering of Internet traffic flows. In particular, we 
highlight two aspects of the best practice, i.e. the SBCK clustering using dis-
crete features. On one hand, it is able to achieve high overall accuracy even 
with relatively small number of clusters. For example, take achieving accuracy 
rate of 90% as a goal, SBCK can reach this with only K=60 in ISP and Wide-
08 data sets and K=30 in other two sets, while its best competitor (i.e. EM 
with discrete features) requires the value of K being 200 to 500. On the other 
hand, for the tasks of clustering to a relatively large number of clusters (e.g. 
K=500), the accuracy of SBCK can reach as high as 96%-99% across traces. 
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Figure 5-5 Overall accuracy results 
 
Figure 5-6 illustrates the per-class performance in terms of averaged F-
measure obtained in the experimental settings of K=100 and K=500. Due to 
space limitation we present only the results in ISP and Keio data sets, but we 
note that those in the rest data sets are similar. From the results we can make 
several observations.  
First of all, SBCK achieves better f-measure results than K-Means and EM 
for almost all classes on both continuous and discrete features. As an example, 
in the experiments of partitioning the ISP data set into five hundred clusters  
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Figure 5-6 Per-class F-measure Results 
 
(top right graph), discrete SBCK obtains 96% to 99% f-measure values for all 
classes except for BitTorrent and HTTP (both around 91%), while discrete 
EM has a number of classes with f-measure lower than 90% such as Bit-
Torrent, HTTP, IMAP and MSN.  
The next finding out of the results is that feature discretization helps to im-
prove the per-class performance for all algorithms in nearly all classes in all 
data sets. In the rare exceptions it slightly decreases the f-measure by up to 
2%. 
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Figure 5-7 Discretization Parameterization 
 
5.5.3 Parameterization for Feature Discretization 
In this section we present more details on the impact of the discretization 
parameter. In the experiments, we vary the parameter from 50 to 200 with 
incremental of 50. We find that in all cases the clustering accuracy achieved 
on discrete features is better than that obtained on continuous features. Figure 
5-7 highlights the improvements in terms of the average increased accuracy for 
different algorithms and numbers of clusters.  
Several observations can be made from the empirical results. Firstly, we can 
see that feature discretization can boost the overall accuracy up to 10-20% 
across the four data sets. Secondly, the range of parameter values makes little 
difference for SBCK, while it does affect the weaker algorithm K-Means to 
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some extent, for which assigning larger number of feature values per bin gen-
erates slightly higher clustering accuracy. Thirdly, the improvement is related 
to the number of clusters. Sharp changes in the curves of increased accuracy 
can be seen as K varies in the range of smaller values, and the improvements 
decrease gradually when the value of K becomes larger and larger. As illus-
trated in Figure 5-4, a small number of clusters cannot fit the data well 
enough and thus produces inaccurate clusters. In these circumstances the im-
pact of using discrete features is sharp but unstable. Furthermore, clustering 
with larger values of K produces better overall accuracy in continuous feature 
space. Therefore the room for improvement becomes smaller. 
In summary, we show that feature discretization using fundamental binning 
methods is an efficient and effective pre-processing process for the task of traf-
fic clustering. 
5.5.4 Run-time Performance 
Although clustering is usually an offline procedure in traffic classification 
systems as depicted in Figure 5-1, the runtime performance is still an im-
portant factor since a faster algorithm allows more frequent system re-training 
and fine-tuning. Thus we present an empirical analysis of the clustering time 
taken by the algorithms in evaluation. In the experiments, we use the Java 
implementation of EM provided in the WEKA suite [106] and a custom C++ 
implementation of K-Means and SBCK. All the programs are run in a single-
threaded fashion on a PC with 2.4 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor and 4GB 
memory.  
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Figure 5-8 Clustering Time Results 
 
The runtime comparison mainly focuses on K-Means and SBCK because on 
one hand these algorithms are implemented on quite a different platform com-
pared with EM, and on the other hand they take significant less time than EM 
(which is in line with the results reported in [80]). For instance, it takes 411 
seconds for partitioning the ISP data set into 100 clusters using EM, in con-
trast to less than 5 seconds using K-Means and SBCK. Also, we find that the 
runtime difference between continuous and discrete features is minor, so we 
focus on the former case for clarity. We show in Figure 5-8 the average clus-
tering time taken by K-Means and SBCK in the experiments.  
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Figure 5-9 Number of Iterations 
 
It is interesting to see that SBCK maintains nearly constant time consump-
tion for different values of K, while the time taken by K-Means is roughly lin-
ear to the number. Depending on the size of the training sets, SBCK takes be-
tween 0.4 and 5 seconds to finish clustering the data sets in all settings. In 
contrast, K-Means takes as little time as 0.2 second when K is small, but it 
takes relatively much longer time (e.g. up to 13 seconds) when K is large.  
In section 4, we noted that the time complexity of SBCK in each iteration 
round is 𝑂(𝑁𝐾𝑑), which is the same as K-Means. Nonetheless, SBCK does 
take more time to perform the extra calculations in cluster assignment step. 
Therefore, it is reasonable that the SBCK program takes more time to finish 
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the whole task, just as in the situation where K is small. But it was unex-
pected to see that SBCK runs faster than K-Means when K is large. In pursuit 
of the reasons for such different time performance, we record the number of 
iterations in each clustering experiment, which is shown in Figure 5-9. It turns 
out that SBCK generally converges in fewer rounds of iterations than K-Means. 
For example, the clustering of ISP data set is done in 5 to 10 rounds for the 
former and around 8 to 15 rounds for the latter.  
In summary, the results show that by incorporating the equivalence con-
straints we can not only improve the quality of resultant clusters, but also 
speeds up the convergence. 
5.5.5 Cluster Interpretations 
Finally, we interpret the cluster compositions by visualizing the distribution 
of protocols across the clusters in terms of both flow number and percentage. 
Figure 5-10 and Figure 5-11 depict the resultant clusters of the ISP traffic 
data, which are found in six example experiments with K=100 by K-Means, 
EM and SBCK using continuous and discrete traffic features respectively. Here 
the clusters are sorted by their size with the largest cluster on the left most. 
Note that the final number of clusters could be less than the pre-defined value 
of 100 for K-Means and SBCK, since it is possible that some clusters end up 
with no assigned sample during the iterations. 
We first look at the clusters obtained in continuous feature space. SBCK has 
its top 10 clusters representing 10 protocols (all classes in ISP trace except for 
HTTP) with an average precision of 96% and covering 62% of the whole data 
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Figure 5-10 Cluster Composition  
(ISP Data Set, Continuous Features, K=100) 
 
The top 10 K-Means and EM clusters stand for 5 classes (all classes but 
MSN and HTTP for K-Means, all classes but POP3 and MSN for EM) with 74% 
and 66% precision and cover 61% and 44% of the data respectively. The traffic 
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Figure 5-11 Cluster Composition  
(ISP Data Set, Discrete Features, K=100) 
 
of HTTP, which is the dominant application in the Internet, spreads over a 
relatively large number of clusters. For example, K-Means has 18 clusters rep-
resenting HTTP, whose average precision is 70%; EM and SBCK have 13 and 
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26 clusters dominated by HTTP traffic with 67% and 77% precision respec-
tively. The result is rational because the World Wide Web serves a wide range 
of purposes in nowadays. The fundamental protocol HTTP has been used for 
various activities such as webpage browsing, file transferring, media streaming 
and so on.  
Figure 5-11 depicts the corresponding example clusters in discrete feature 
space. In comparison to Figure 5-10 we can see that the clusters are more pure 
in terms of compositions and the size of clusters is distributed more evenly 
(especially for EM). The top 20 clusters derived by SBCK have representatives 
for 10 out of the 11 protocols (except for HTTP), and cover 71% of data with 
an average precision of 96.7%. The top 20 EM clusters represent 10 protocols 
(except for Bit Torrent) and have 42% coverage of flows with 90% precision. 
Finally, K-Means has its top 20 clusters representing 10 protocols except for 
HTTP and covering 58% data with 87.6% precision.  
Finally, a side observation can be made from the graph of clusters. The dis-
tribution of the size of clusters generated by the three algorithms is quite dif-
ferent. SBCK and K-Means tend to produce a few large clusters along with a 
lot of small ones, while the clusters derived by EM are more evenly distributed 
in size. This is due to the cluster assignment methods in use (i.e. hard vs. soft).  
5.6 Conclusion 
In the task of Internet traffic clustering, we have observed the existence of 
abundant side information, which indicates partial equivalence relationship 
among IP flows. In light of the observation, we propose a semi-supervised traf-
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fic clustering scheme that incorporates the knowledge in the form of equiva-
lence set constraints. The proposed algorithm, namely SBCK, is an approxi-
mate method for fitting both data and set-based constraints to a Gaussian 
mixture model. Moreover, we apply the equal-frequency binning method for 
feature discretization so as to further improve the clustering accuracy. We car-
ry out extensive experiments on real-world Internet traces and the results sug-
gest that the proposed approach not only significantly improves the overall 
accuracy of Internet traffic clustering, but also speeds up the convergence of 
clustering process. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6 AUTOMATIC PROTOCOL 
SIGNATURE LEARNING 
Classifying network traffic by matching protocol signatures in traffic payload 
has been widely applied in industry. However, deriving accurate and efficient 
signatures for various application protocols is not a trivial task. Traditionally, 
it is done by network professionals through manual analysis of protocol specifi-
cations (if available) or packet traces. The process is labour-intensive and er-
ror-prone. 
In this chapter, we tackle the problem of automatic protocol signature learn-
ing. Specifically, we focus on generating regular expression signatures from la-
belled packet trace data. The proposed scheme consists of four modules: pre-
processing for extracting application session payload; tokenization for finding 
common substrings and incorporating position constraints; multiple sequence 
alignment for finding common sub-sequences; and signature construction for 
transforming the alignment results into regular expressions. 
A real-world full payload packet trace is used to evaluate the proposed 
scheme, and signatures for a range of application protocols are automatically 
derived and tested. 
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6.1 Motivations 
Learning accurate application protocol signatures is a challenge task for pay-
load-based network traffic classification. In practice, the protocol signatures 
are derived by network professionals through manual analysis of protocol spec-
ifications (if available) or packet traces with complete payload. The effort is 
not only highly time-consuming but also error-prone.  
The most critical challenge is the lack of publicly available documentations. 
Although there are standard RFCs for the public-domain protocols, a large 
number of proprietary application protocols are short of open specifications.  
In addition, some applications have a variety of implementations, some of 
which do not fully comply with the specifications in the available documenta-
tion. Thus the signatures obtained according to the specifications may not 
cover all the variants.  
Finally, due to the rapid evolution of network applications, the signatures 
are also subject to change with time. Therefore the labour-intensive manual 
signature learning process has to be repeated from time to time in order to 
keep the signatures up to date. 
Therefore, a lot of research effort [21-29] has been devoted to automatic pro-
tocol signature learning. However, the signatures derived in previous work are 
fundamentally different from real-world handcrafted signatures. For example, 
they are defined as model-based in [21][22][23]. It is hard to apply these signa-
tures to the existing network systems. In this chapter, we develop a novel 
scheme that extracts practical signatures from labelled traffic data. 
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6.2  Signature Generation Problem 
6.2.1 Signature Definition 
In this chapter, we focus on learning application protocol signatures, which 
could be used for protocol inference by matching the signatures against traffic 
payloads. The signature for an application protocol is designed to capture the 
invariant and unique properties that will appear in all sessions initiated by the 
particular application. Such patterns are caused by the protocol message for-
mats and protocol state machines, which could not be modified without de-
functioning the protocol exchange process. 
Different types of signatures are proposed and used in some real-world tools 
and related research. We summarize the signature types and illustrate some 
examples in Table 6-1.  
x Common substring signature is defined as a single, contiguous byte 
string that appears in payload content. This can be further divided 
into two classes in terms of matching at a fixed offset or at variable 
offsets in the payload content. Such signatures have been used for 
identifying P2P traffic [5][6][7] and worm detection [26].  
x Substring set signature consists of a set of substrings, and matches a 
flow if all elements in the set are found in its payload, in any order. 
This signature is proposed for detecting polymorphic worms [27]. It 
has been further extended to become a multi-set signature model [28], 
where the occurrences count of each substring is taken into account.  
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Table 6-1 Signature Types 
Name Example or Description Target 
Protocol 
Source 
Common 
substring 
"0xe3", "0xc5" eDonkey2000 [6] 
"0x13BitTorrent protocol" BitTorrent [7] 
".ida? ", "%u7801" Red Code II [26] 
Substring 
set 
{"GET ", " HTTP/1.1\r\n", ": 
","\r\nHost: ", "\r\n", ": 
","\r\nHost: ", "\xFF\xBF", 
"\r\n"} 
Apache 
Knacker 
Polygraph 
[27] 
{".ida? ": 1, "%u780": 
1,"HTTP/1.0\r\n":1, "GET/": 
1,"%u": 2} 
Red Code II Hamsa [28] 
Substring 
sequence 
"GET 
/.*.ida?.*XX.*%u.*%u7801.*HT
TP/1.0\r\n" 
Red Code II Polygraph [27] 
"HTTP/1.", 
"GET\0x20/.*HTTP/1." HTTP AutoSig 
[25] "USER\0x20.*PASS\0x20", "erv-
er.*+OK\0x20" SMTP 
Regexp 
"http/(0\.9|1\.0|1\.1) [1-5][0-9][0-
9] [\x09-\x0d -
~]*(connection:|content-
type:|content-length:|date:)|post 
[\x09-\x0d -~]* http/[01]\.[019]" 
HTTP 
l7-filter 
[12] 
"^220[\x09-\x0d -~]* 
(e?smtp|simple mail)" SMTP 
"GET/*.ida?*XX[15]%u*%u780*
=[7]HTTP/1.0\r\n"  (It is a 
simplified regular expression) 
Red Code II SRE [29] 
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x Substring sequence signature consists of an ordered set of substrings, 
and matches a flow if and only if the payload contains the sequence 
of substrings in the same order. It is more specific than substring set 
signature as it makes an ordering constraint [27]. 
x Regular expression (regexp) is a popular technique which provides a 
concise and flexible means of signature matching. It is utilized in 
many well-known network intrusion detection systems and traffic 
classification systems (e.g., Snort, Bro, l7-filter, and IPP2P). The 
common substring signature and substring sequence signature above 
are indeed special forms of regexps.  
x Simplified regular expression (SRE), a regexp that contains only two 
qualifiers, i.e., “.*” and “.{k}”, has also been proposed for worm 
matching [29]. The motivation is that many syntax rules of regexp 
are rarely used for matching worms in the real world, thus a SRE 
signature is efficient and also compatible with existing systems.  
In our work, we define the signature as regular expressions with a certain 
subset of the standard syntax rules, which are listed in Table 6-2.  
The motivations for generating regexp type of signatures are as follows. First 
of all, it is able to provide great flexibility and expressive power that allows 
efficient identification of applications. Secondly, regexp is the de facto stand-
ard pattern matching language of choice in deep packet inspection, supported 
by most popular systems such as l7-filter, IPP2P, Snort and Bro. Hence the 
signatures derived by our approach can be easily integrated in the libraries in 
practice. 
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Table 6-2 Regular Expression Signature Syntax 
Character Description 
\xFF Matches the byte with the specified ASCII/ANSI value, where FF are 2 hexadecimal digits. 
^ Matches the starting position within the payload content. 
$ Matches the ending position of the payload content. 
. Matches any single byte. 
* Matches the preceding element zero or more times. 
{n} Matches the preceding element exactly n times. 
| Matches either the expression before or the expression af-ter it. 
() Comes along with the choice operator. For example, (ab|cd) matches "ab" or "cd". 
 
Also, due to the wide adoption of regular expressions, lots of researchers 
have proposed novel techniques to accelerate the matching process for very 
high speed links, including improved finite state machines and FPGA/GPU 
implementations [14-20]. 
Compared with the signatures studied in previous research [21-29], a main 
advantage of our signatures is that we include position constraints, i.e., "^" 
and "$" denoting the starting and the ending of payload data respectively. Al-
so, the choice operator is another novel feature which allows a more compact 
and accurate way for encoding protocol information. For protocol inference, 
these are two of the most wanted features in regexp that are missed by previ-
ous automatic approaches. As we can see in the pattern library of l7-filter, the 
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well-known application layer packet classifier for Linux, a large number of 
handcrafted signatures contain at least one of these features.  
6.2.2 Problem Statement 
Given a training data set that consists of sessions from a number of applica-
tions, our goal is to find a regular expression signature for each presented ap-
plication, which covers most flows of the particular application and few flows 
of other applications. In particular, our scheme is designed to meet the follow-
ing goals. 
x Signature quality. For any signature generation scheme, accuracy is al-
ways the most critical factor. For each application class, our goal is to de-
velop a signature that is general enough to match most of the flows from 
the class (high true positives) while at the same time specific enough to 
match few flows from other classes (low false positives). 
x Efficient signature matching. For the sake of deploying real-time clas-
sification in high-speed networks, the signature matching process needs to 
be efficient. The signatures derived by our approach are a subset of regular 
expression. They can be transformed into finite state machines, thus those 
advanced algorithms and hardware design can be taken full advantage to 
support high-throughput matching.  
x Efficient signature generation. Efficient algorithms allow not only 
faster signature generation but also larger input data set (which probably 
means better signature quality). Although we consider it as an offline pro-
cess, the processing speed might become an important factor if the practi-
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cal system involves a constant update cycle. Thus we bear in mind to min-
imize the computational cost of our approach to the extent possible.  
x Early signature matching. In real-time deployment, it is critical to 
identify the source application of a flow in its early stage so as to take ac-
tion against it. To achieve this goal, we limit ourselves to derive signatures 
from the initial part of each session. Intuitively, this choice also keeps us 
focused on the negotiation phase of the applications, where signalling mes-
sages are more likely to be exchanged rather than data messages. Therefore 
it is easier to capture the message formats without being obscured by arbi-
trary application data.  
x Signature portability. Our approach takes a training set as input and 
produces signatures for matching the applications in the provided data. 
Then a natural question is that whether the signatures can be used in a 
site other than where the training data are collected. Since the signatures 
are based solely on payload and will not be affected by network dynamics, 
they are born to be portable. Nonetheless, we note that the quality of the 
training data, e.g., size, diversity, coverage and representative, does affect 
the quality of produced signatures.  
x Unidirectional signatures. We do not want to make the assumption 
that a classifier can monitor both directions of a flow, since this may not 
be true for the observation points in network core, due to routing asymme-
tries. So we decide to generate a protocol signature for each direction of 
the application sessions. 
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Figure 6-1 System Architecture 
6.3 Methodology 
The architecture of our automatic signature generation scheme is depicted in 
Figure 6-1. There are four principal components.  
x Pre-processing module. It tracks and normalizes traffic flows and ex-
tracts packet payload in the form of byte sequences.  
x Tokenization module. For the traffic flows from each protocol, we start 
by looking for the common substrings of a minimum 2-byte length (re-
ferred to as tokens) that occur in at least a number of k flows. (This is 
supposed to be a large proportion of flows.) Next we process the tokens 
and introduce position constraints if possible. For completeness, single-
byte position-specific tokens will also be extracted.  
x Multiple sequence alignment. In this module, a progressive multiple se-
quence alignment will be run to find the common subsequence. The algo-
rithm consists of three stages: in the first stage all pairs of sequences are 
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separately aligned in order to calculate a similarity matrix; in the next 
stage a guide tree is built from the matrix; and in the third stage all se-
quences are progressively aligned according to the tree.  
x Signature construction. Finally, the alignment results are combined and 
transformed into regular expressions.  
6.3.1 Pre-Processing 
The pre-processing module basically works in the same way as its counter-
part in the real-time classification system. It observes raw packets from a net-
work tap or packet trace files, which are then tracked into application sessions 
according to the 5-tuple of {srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort, Protocol}. Next is 
a TCP/IP normalizer that deals with IP fragmentation and TCP reconstruc-
tion. The last step is the extraction of application layer payload. According to 
our design goal, the initial parts of payload in each direction of an application 
session are extracted. By initial, we do not want to exactly truncate the data 
to the first N bytes, although it is a common way [21-29]; instead, we truncate 
payload at the first packet ending that exceeds N bytes, see Figure 6-2. In this 
way, we are able to capture the valuable information at the end of messages. 
Each flow is then represented by a pair of byte sequences (i.e., initiator to re-
sponder and the opposite direction) whose lengths may vary. We produce a 
signature for each direction.  
In summary, the module belongs to a message based - per flow state payload 
processing method as discussed in [9]. It needs to maintain a session table 
which consists of flow ID (5-tuple), flow state and normalized data buffer, etc. 
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Table 6-3 K-Common Substrings Extraction 
The K-Common Substrings Extraction Problem 
INPUT: A set of K sequences 𝐵 = {𝐵1,𝐵2,… , 𝐵𝐾} , a minimum length 
𝑙𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 2 bytes, and a minimum coverage 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛 =  10% × 𝐾. 
OUTPUT: A set of distinct substrings 𝑆 = {𝑆1, 𝑆2, …} that meet the mini-
mum length and coverage requirements, and the occurrence counts {𝑐1, 𝑐2,… }, 
where 𝑆𝑖 is a substring that is common to a number of 𝑐𝑖 input sequences. 
 
6.3.2 Advanced Tokenization 
In our scheme, we define a token as a common substring or a combination of 
common substrings (by using a choice operator), with or without position con-
strain. In this section, we discuss the tokenization methods including the dis-
covery of common substrings and the incorporation of advanced features. 
6.3.2.1K-common Substrings 
The tokens are developed based on the substrings which are common to the 
input byte sequences of each application class. The extraction problem is de-
fined in Table 6-3. 
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This is a variant of the K-common substring problem introduced in [102]. A 
straightforward solution is to build a generalized suffix tree for the K input 
sequences, and then run a bottom up traversal, in which for each internal node 
the count of distinct leaf identifiers in its sub-tree is computed. After that an-
other traversal is run to find and store the distinct substrings. The time com-
plexity of the process is 𝑂(𝐾𝑛), where K is the number of input sequences 
whose lengths sum to n.  
Note that some advanced methods could be used to make this process more 
efficient. For example, a linear time solution can be achieved by using the al-
gorithm described in [102], and by replacing the suffix tree with suffix array 
we could further reduce space requirement and speed up the extraction process 
[28]. For evaluation purpose, we decide to implement the basic algorithm using 
the popular C++ suffix tree library. In average, it takes only a few seconds to 
process a set of 1000 sequences in our experiments.  
We need to prune out the non-distinct substrings extracted in the last step 
[27]. But before that, we first attempt to merge the substrings if they share a 
same prefix or suffix. As an example, among the substrings extracted from 
1000 HTTP reply-flows in our trace (see Section 6.4), "HTTP/1.", "HTTP/1.1 
" and "HTTP/1.0 " occur in 1000, 724 and 276 flows respectively, such that 
"HTTP/1." always appears as a prefix of the other two. Therefore it is reason-
able to merge them into a single token "HTTP/1.(1|0) ", which contains equal 
amount of information and also matches all flows. In general, we scan through 
the substring sets; for each substring that is a prefix/suffix of some other sub-
strings, we merge them into one token using the choice operator.  
 126 
 
HTTP/1.
HTTP/1.1_ HTTP/1.0_
HTTP/1.1_20
HTTP/1.1_30
HTTP/1.1_40
HTTP/1.
1_ 0_
HTTP/1.0_30
HTTP/1.0_20
1000
724 276
20 30 40 30 20
HTTP/1.(1|0)
HTTP/1.(1|0)
1000
HTTP/1.(1|0)_20
HTTP/1.(1|0)_30
HTTP/1.(1|0)_40
20
30
40
570
104
56
58
209
779 56
162
(a)
(b)
"B"VWDQGVIRUVSDFH
 
Figure 6-3 Token Merging Based on Trie 
 
The merging algorithm is based on a trie (prefix tree) structure. Figure 6-3 
(a) depicts the trie built with all the substrings that contain "HTTP/1.". The 
node representing "HTTP/1." has two children, which are merged into a new 
node as in Figure 6-3 (b). For the sake of efficiency, only one level will be 
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merged for each trie and the offspring will be separated into new tokens. Also, 
a threshold 𝛼merge is set to restrict the maximum number of children to be 
merged. For the rest non-distinct substrings that cannot be merged, we simply 
prune them out unless they occur in at least k flows as standalone substrings.  
6.3.2.2 Introducing Position Constraints 
The application layer payload of some protocols reveals position-specific in-
formation. On one hand, some of the tokens found in the last step always ap-
pear at the same offset in payload. For instance, the token "HTTP/1.(1|0)" 
discussed above always occurs at the beginning of HTTP reply-flows. On the 
other hand, at some particular offsets there exist only a few different values. 
For example, for 1000 HTTP initiate-flows in our training data, offset 0 is al-
ways started with three tokens (i.e., "GET", "HEAD" and "POST").  Thus it is 
again rational to merge them into "^(GET|HEAD|POST)". 
In order to capture the position properties in the signatures, we transform 
each flow into a set of vectors: {〈𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 1, 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡 1〉, 〈𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 2, 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡 2〉,…}, 
where the first element in each vector represents a token that occurs in the 
flow and the second element indicates the offset position where the token oc-
curs.  
Then we perform two searches across all the sessions.  In the first round, for 
each token we record the number of different offsets it occurs. If a token is al-
ways found at a particular offset, then we mark it as position-specific. In the 
second round, we first look for the offsets that appear in a large portion of 
flows (i.e., more than 𝑘offset flows), and then for each of them we count the 
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number of different tokens that start from it. If that number is smaller than a 
threshold 𝛽merge, we combine those tokens using the choice operator and mark 
the resulted token as position-specific as well. If the specific position is the be-
ginning of a flow, we add a "^" before it. 
6.3.2.3Single-byte Tokens 
For common substring extraction we have set the minimum length-constrain 
to be two bytes. As a result, one-byte features are not included in the preced-
ing procedure.  
However, single byte values can be informative when combining with posi-
tion constrain, especially for binary protocols where distinctive features appear 
at fixed offsets. For instance, the very last byte of QQ (a popular instant mes-
saging application in China) packets is always "\x03", which denotes end-of-
message. Therefore, we develop a method for finding single-byte tokens.  
Ma et al. [22] has proposed a product distribution model that describes each 
byte offset in a flow with its byte distribution. We build a similar distribution 
model in a slightly different way, that is, we model each offset of the first n 
bytes (forward) and the last n bytes (backward) of flows.  
Figure 6-4 illustrates the idea. We treat each byte offset separately and mark 
those positions who have limited different values (i.e., the number of different 
values is smaller than threshold 𝛾merge). If the first byte (or the last byte) is 
marked, we add a "^" (or "$") for it. In the QQ example, the last byte is se-
lected as a token "\x03$". 
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Figure 6-4 Single Byte Offset Modelling 
 
6.3.3 Multiple Sequence Alignment 
To find the best common subsequence, we use the Multiple Sequence Align-
ment (MSA) technique, which is widely studied and applied in bioinformatics 
for finding regions of similarity in biological sequences.  
Computing an optimal MSA is a NP complete problem that can only be 
solved for a small number of sequences [104]. Thus the practical algorithms are 
based on heuristic rather than global optimization. Progressive alignment, e.g., 
Clustal W [104] and T-Coffee [103], is the most widely used heuristic-based 
approach, which builds up the final MSA progressively by a series of pair-wise 
alignments, starting from the most similar pair and progressing to the most 
distant pair.  
In our work, we develop a customized progressive algorithm based on the 
framework of Clustal W. Specifically, instead of using the pair-wise alignment 
methods provided in the original program, we implement a new local algo-
rithm that accepts byte sequences as input and incorporates the token-based 
scoring scheme.   
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6.3.3.1Pair-wise Alignment 
Aligning two sequences involves maximizing a similarity scoring model as in 
equation (6-1), where S denotes the score for a match, mismatch or indel (i.e. 
insertion or deletion), and k denotes the number of matches, mismatches or 
indels.  
𝑆(𝑋, 𝑌 ) = 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ × 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ + 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ × 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ + 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑙 × 𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑙 (6-1) 
Setting scoring parameters is a focus of ongoing sequence alignment research 
and is domain-specific. The simplest case in computer science is the Longest 
Common Subsequence (LCS) algorithm that computes the global similarity 
between two strings with parameters 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ = 1 and 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ = 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑙 = 0. 
However, the model is not suitable for signature generation [27] because it 
guarantees a maximum similarity in terms of the number of matched charac-
ters rather than consecutive matches, which is preferred for producing mean-
ingful and low false-positive signatures.  
In order to reward contiguous character matches, and more importantly to 
reward token matches in the alignment, we develop a token-based scoring 
scheme. It is inspired by the biology applications where a scoring model is ta-
ble driven, e.g., when considering Watson-Crick pairings a G-G match may be 
worth more than an A-A match.  
We score a match using equation 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ∗ = 1 + 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠, where 
the 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 = 1 is a bonus for all tokens and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 = 1 is an additional 
bonus for those position-specific tokens. For penalties we set the score of an 
indel or a mismatch as −1. Moreover, before aligning we have to pre-process 
the sessions and replace those merged tokens with special symbols, such that 
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they are not counted as mismatches in the alignment. For instance, 
"^(GET|HEAD|POST)" is represented by "ẠẠẠ" (with the length equals to 
the shortest token), and similarly "HTTP/1.(1|0) " is transformed into 
"ẸẸẸẸẸẸẸẸẸ".  
Another design choice to make is the strategy of alignment, which can be di-
vided into two classes: global and local. The former tries to align the full 
lengths of the sequences with each other (the LCS model belongs to this class). 
While the latter seeks to find regions of the sequences that have high similari-
ty. A difference is that local alignment does not penalize dissimilar contiguous 
sequences in both prefixes and suffixes of X and Y. In our case local alignment 
is appropriate because the message format of application protocols only ap-
pears in some regions of the whole payload (of which a large portion should be 
the application data). Thus we implement an adaptation of the Smith-
Waterman local alignment algorithm [105] with the proposed scoring scheme.  
6.3.3.2Progressive Alignment 
The MSA algorithm in our approach involves three steps.  
In the first step, all pairs of the input sequences are aligned using the algo-
rithm described in last section. For N sequences, there are 𝑁(𝑁 − 1) 2⁄  pair-
wise alignment results. The similarity scores are converted to distances by 
normalizing and subtracting from one. Thus a distance matrix is obtained.  
In the next step, a tree used to guide the final multiple alignment process is 
calculated from the distance matrix using the Neighbour Joining method [104] 
as described in Clustal W.  
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Figure 6-5 An Example of the Alignment and Signature Generation 
 
The final stage is to progressively align larger and larger groups of sequences 
according to the guide tree. At each stage, a new alignment is computed from 
two sequences or existing alignments. The process ends when all input se-
quences are aligned, and the final result is outputted.  
Suppose we have N sequences of length L as the input to our sequence 
alignment algorithm. The time complexity of the local pair-wise alignment is 
𝑂(𝐿2) and the complexity of the progressive alignment is 𝑂(𝑁2𝐿2) + 𝑂(𝑁3) +
𝑂(𝑁𝐿2), where each component represents each stage respectively.  
6.3.4 Signature Construction 
The final stage of our approach is to transform the alignment results into 
regular expression signatures. It is done by changing the special symbols back 
sqe1: USER xxx\x0D\x0APASS XXX\x0D\x0ASTAT
sqe2: USER yyyyyy\x0D\x0APASS YYY\x0D\x0ASTAT
sqe3: USER zzzz\x0D\x0APASS ZZZ\x0D\x0ASTAT
Alignment1:
seq1:    USER -xxx\x0D\x0APASS XXX\x0D\x0ASTAT
||||| ...|   |   |||||...|   |   ||||
seq3:    USER zzzz\x0D\x0APASS ZZZ\x0D\x0ASTAT
UHVXOW86(5ĭǻǻǻ\x0D\[$3$66ǻǻǻ\x0D\x0ASTAT
Alignment2:
result1: USER --ĭǻǻǻ\x0D\[$3$66ǻǻǻ\x0D\x0ASTAT
|||||   ...|   |   |||||...|   |   ||||
seq2:    USER yyyyyy\x0D\x0APASS YYY\x0D\x0ASTAT
result2: USER ĭĭĭǻǻǻ\x0D\x0APASS ǻǻǻ\x0D\x0ASTAT
Transform: ĻĻ
regexp:  USER .*\x0D\x0APASS .{3}\x0D\x0ASTAT
1RWHĭVWDQGVIRULQGHOV
ǻVWDQGVIRUPLVPDWFKHV
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to tokens, and replacing the variable length with ".*" and the fixed length gaps 
with ".{n}". Figure 6-5 presents a simplified example of the alignment and 
transformation process. 
6.4 Evaluation 
In this part, we use a full payload packet trace captured at a local educa-
tional site in China, which connects about a hundred elementary schools and 
high schools to the Internet via a full-duplex Gigabit Ethernet link. The rea-
son for not using publicly available packet traces is that they do not contain 
any application layer data. In the evaluation, we consider a range of applica-
tions that account for a large proportion of the collected traffic and represent 
different applications types. To build the ground truth, we classify the trace 
by hand based on all sources of available information obtained both from the 
traffic itself (e.g. port numbers, payload, traffic properties, and connection 
patterns) and from the administration setting (e.g. topologies, firewall rules, 
internal server deployment). Two separate data sets are collected on the 8th 
and 15th of January 2009. We randomly take 1000 flows for each class from 
the first set to generate the training data, and use those from the second set 
for testing. The experiment is done on a PC with a 2.56GHz dual-core CPU 
running Linux FC 10. 
Regarding the setting of the parameters, for payload truncation in the pre-
processing, we set N = 256; for k-common substring extraction, we set mini-
mum substring length 𝑙𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 2 and the minimum coverage 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛 =  10% × 𝐾; 
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for token merging, we set 𝛼merge = 𝛽merge = γmerge = 5, and 𝑘offset = 𝐾 (which 
means we only consider position-specific tokens that appear in all the flows).  
6.4.1 Signature Analysis 
The signatures generated from our data sets are presented in Table 6-4. We 
also show the available patterns from other work, including two automatic 
systems AutoSig and LASER that generate substring sequences, and the man-
ually derived pattern library of l7-filter (the regexps for l7-filter are case insen-
sitive and without "\x00" due to implementation details). Compared with the 
previous automatic methods, we can see that our approach generates more so-
phisticated signatures which are close to the manually derived patterns.  
For HTTP, our method only encodes version number 1.0 and 1.1 since there 
is no traffic from version 0.9 in the training data; similarly, only three method 
types are found in the data; in the reply flows our approach only learn partial 
information of the status code. 
Regarding FTP, our signatures successfully capture the negotiation proce-
dure of the protocol. L7-filter’s pattern assumes the server will say something 
after "220" and include the string "ftp". In our trace, we find that the assump-
tion is risky.  
The message format of POP3 is similar to FTP, thus their signatures for ini-
tiate direction are almost the same. Fortunately, the reply packets from pop3 
servers exhibit unique features as they always start with "+OK" (again, the "-
ERR" as included in l7-filter’s pattern is missed by us due to data limitation). 
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Table 6-4 Resultant Signatures 
Proto 
Dataset 
Size 
Signatures by AppID 
(One signature for each 
direction) 
Signatures in other work 
(Automatic: AutoSig & LASER; 
Manual: l7-filter) 
HTTP 1000 
"^(GET|HEAD|POST) .* 
HTTP/1.(1|0)\x0D\x0A" 
"HTTP/1."; 
"GET .*HTTP/1." 
AutoSig 
"^HTTP/1.(1|0) 
[2|3|4|5]0.*\x0D\x0A" 
"http/(0\.9|1\.0|1\.1) [1-5][0-
9][0-9] [\x09-\x0d -
~]*(connection:|content-
type:|content-
length:|date:)|post [\x09-
\x0d -~]* http/[01]\.[019] " 
l7-filter 
FTP 
control 
1000 
"^USER .*\x0D\x0APASS " "230 logged" LASER 
"^220(-| ).*\x0D\x0A331 " "^220[\x09-\x0d -~]*ftp" l7-filter 
POP3 836 
"^ (USER|user)  
.*\x0D\x0APASS " 
"USER .*PASS "; "+OK "; … 
(6 signatures in total) 
AutoSig 
"^\+OK.*\+OK" "^(\+ok |-err )" l7-filter 
BT 
(TCP) 
1000 
"^\x13BitTorrent protocol 
(ex|\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00)" 
"^\x13BitTorrent protocol "; 
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" 
AutoSig 
"^\x13BitTorrent protocol 
(ex|\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00)" 
"^(\x13bittorrent proto-
col|azver\x01$|…" (truncat-
ed) 
l7-filter  
BT 
Tracker 
1000 
"^GET 
/announce?info_hash=.*&peer
_id…" (truncated) 
"^get 
/scrape\?info_hash=get 
/announce\?info_hash=" 
l7-filter 
^(HTTP/1.0 302 
Found\x0D\x0ALocation: 
http://|HTTP/1.0 200 
OK\x0D 
\x0A\x0D\x0Ad(8:completei|1
0:done peersi)) 
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Proto 
Dataset 
Size 
Signatures by AppID 
(One signature for each 
direction) 
Signatures in other work 
(Automatic: AutoSig & LASER; 
Manual: l7-filter) 
Edonkey 
(TCP) 
1000 
"^\xE3.\x00\x00\x00\x01\x10.
*\x00[CHN]([|yourname)" 
"^[\xc5\xd4\xe3-
\xe5].?.?.?.?([\x01\x02 …" 
(truncated) 
l7-filter 
"^(\xE3|\xC5).\x00\x00\x00" 
QQ 1000 
"\x03$" 
"\x02\x11\x5B\x00"; 
"\x02\x11\x4D\x00" 
AutoSig 
"\x03$" "^.?.?\x02.+\x03$ " l7-filter 
DNS 1000 
"^.{2}\x01\x00\x00\x01\x00\x
00\x00\x00\x00\x00" "^.?.?.?.?[\x01\x02].?.?.?.?.?.
?[\x01-?] …" (truncated) 
l7-filter 
"^.{2}(\x81|\x85)(\x82\x83
\x80)\x00\x01\x00" 
  
The main protocol messages of BitTorrent are easy to identify as they al-
ways start with the protocol name, the feature is captured by our system as 
well as other systems.  
Edonkey flows may begin with "\xc5", "\xd4", "\xe3", "\xe4" or "\xe5" as ob-
served by the l7-filter pattern author, but in our trace only two values are seen 
and captured by our system. Besides, the string "[CHN]" is found in every 
edonkey session, which might be specific to the user region.  
For QQ, our approach successfully finds the single-byte end-of-message flag, 
which is missed by AutoSig.  
Finally, the DNS signatures derived by our method are quite specific. All the 
initiate sessions in our training data are starting with a 2-byte random ID and 
a same flag "\x1\x0", followed by a string "\x0\x1\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0\x0" in 8-
byte length denoting one query and nothing else.  
 137 
 
In conclusion, our approach is able to generate signatures that capture most 
critical protocol message features contained in the training data. 
6.4.2 Signature Matching 
The signatures are applied on the testing set, and the classification result is 
given in Table 6-5, in terms of false negatives and false positives. In the table, 
Init/Reply denotes the result of signatures for the initiate/reply direction, and 
Com denotes a combination result, where flows are counted as identified only 
if signatures for both directions are matched. 
6.4.2.1False Negative Rate Analysis 
The HTTP-initiate signature generates a relatively high false negative rate. 
We examine those misclassified sessions and find out that a large amount of 
them (i.e., 61 flows) are long requests that contain cookies and thus have no 
"HTTP/1.(1|0)" presented in the truncated payload. The rest misclassifications 
are due to a rare separator "\x0A" and an "OPTION" method that are not 
seen in the training data.  
The signatures for FTP miss a number of unsuccessful connections, in which 
the server responses with a "530" instead of "331". Note that the l7-filter’s FTP 
pattern gets a much higher FN rate (341), since the string "ftp" does not ap-
pear after "220" in those flows. This example shows that the process of manual 
protocol derivation could be quite tricky.  
There are three DNS testing flows having a new flag ("\x83\x80"), which is 
not presented in the training data set. Therefore, it cannot be matched by the 
automatically learned signature.  
 138 
 
Table 6-5 Classification Results 
Protocol Testing Set False Negatives (FN) False Positives (FP) 
Init Rep Com Init Rep Com 
HTTP 5000 64 6 68 0 2000 0 
FTP 5000 9 28 28 836 0 0 
POP3 836 N/A N/A N/A 4991 0 0 
BitTorrent 5000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BTP 2000 0 0 0 0 4 4 
Edonkey 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
QQ 2000 0 0 0 3 14 17 
DNS 5000 0 3 3 0 0 0 
 
6.4.2.2False Positive Rate Analysis 
The signatures for the initiate direction of FTP and POP3 are basically the 
same, which is due to their similar protocol specifications. As a result, their 
signatures in this direction completely misclassify each other’s traffic. However, 
the signatures for the reply direction are distinct and generate no false posi-
tives. Also, BitTorrent Tracker uses HTTP so that its traffic is matched by 
the HTTP-reply signature (but not the initiate direction). If traffic from both 
directions can be observed, we can combine the results from two directions to 
significantly decrease false positive predictions.  
In short, the overall classification accuracy of the signatures is higher than 
99.55%. As side information, we note that in this testing data set, the tradi-
tional port-based classifier only achieves an accuracy of 58.9%.  
The automatically generated signatures are not perfect and their quality de-
pends heavily on the diversity and coverage of the training data. It is imprac-
tical to include a feature in the signature if it is not presented in the training 
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data. Nonetheless, we argue that there is no perfect signature. Even deriving 
signatures according to the protocol specifications could be tricky. For those 
applications that have open documentation, our tool can serve as a starting 
point of further signature refinements.  
6.4.3 Discussions 
We propose a novel approach that automatically generates application signa-
tures from a labelled training data set. The approach has limitations, which 
can be categorized into two classes. Those in the first category are due to the 
fundamental of payload-based classification method. The other limitations are 
specific to our approach. 
A prerequisite for deploying payload-based traffic classifier is the availability 
of packet payload. In such cases as classifying packet header traces, identifying 
encrypted applications and undergoing privacy restrictions, no payload data is 
available, so that alternative techniques (e.g., statistics-based) have to be used. 
Another limitation of payload-based method is that some applications employ 
multi-connection session structures. For example, FTP maintains a main con-
nection for exchanging control message and creates new connections for file 
transferring. The connections for file transferring contain no protocol message 
but rather raw files. To track down such applications, session structure discov-
ering techniques [100] could be adopted, which automatically associates related 
connections according to a statistical model.  
We focus on developing signature generation method in this chapter and as-
sume that our system is supplied with a labelled training data set. In the fu-
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ture, we plan to develop a solution that is completely free from human efforts. 
To further automate the signature learning process, the traffic clustering tech-
niques we studied in previous chapters could be used. Although the semi-
supervised clustering approach is able to derive highly pure clusters, there 
would still be a small portion of noise, i.e., mislabelled flows. Although we do 
not consider noise in this chapter, the approach could be adjusted to become 
noise tolerant. We leave this exploration for future work.  
6.5 Conclusion 
To tackle the problem of automatic protocol signature learning for network 
traffic classification, we present a novel scheme that derives regular expression 
signatures from traffic data. The signatures are close to real life handcrafted 
patterns because they consist of the critical regular expression features that 
are essential for identifying applications. Our scheme generates signatures with 
two novel approaches. One is the refined token extraction algorithm, and the 
other is the progressive multiple sequence alignment algorithm integrating a 
token-based scoring scheme. The experimental results indicate that with well-
designed scheme, the labour-intensive signature deriving process could be fully 
automated. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE 
WORK 
This chapter concludes the thesis and discusses a number of directions for 
future research. 
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7.1 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have addressed a number of practical problems and pro-
posed effective solutions in regard to automating the process of network traffic 
classification. 
First, we have presented a systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of train-
ing network traffic classifiers using supervised machine learning methods, with 
a focus on the performance on unknown types of traffic. We have showed that 
the common training scheme that builds a multiclass classifier for the target 
applications is not capable of telling apart unknown traffic, and the other 
scheme that trains a binary or one-class classifier for each of the target appli-
cations can identify up to 60% of unknown traffic. 
Second, we have then studied the traffic clustering methods that learn from 
completely unknown (unlabelled) traffic data. We have proposed a novel un-
supervised clustering approach based on random forest proximity, which 
achieves much better accuracy results (up to 22% improvement) compared 
with the classic algorithms applied in previous studies. Furthermore, we have 
proposed a semi-supervised clustering approach that incorporates the widely 
available side information of the traffic. The semi-supervised approach has 
been showed to be able to derive highly accuracy (up to 99%) traffic clusters 
in the extensive experiments. 
Third, we have proposed an automatic protocol signature learning approach 
to derive regular expression signatures from labelled training traffic data. The 
method has been applied to a full-payload traffic data set and the signatures 
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for eight dominant protocols have been extracted. We have analysed and com-
pared the signatures with some handcrafted signatures from existing systems, 
and the classification results in terms of false positives and false negatives have 
been presented to show the effectiveness of our signatures.  
In summary, the methods proposed in this thesis can serve as solid building 
blocks for the fully automated network traffic classification solution. 
7.2 Future Work 
In the future, we plan to extend our work in the following directions. 
First, the automatic protocol signature learning scheme studied in the thesis 
is designed to learn signatures from labelled training data. A natural extension 
to further reduce the human intervention is to learn signatures from unlabelled 
data. This might be realized by combining the statistics-based traffic cluster-
ing techniques with the signature learning process. In other words, given a set 
of unlabelled training data, we first perform traffic clustering to break the data 
set down to clusters that are ideally comprising flows of a single application; 
and then signatures could be automatically learned from each of the clusters. 
Although we can use the semi-supervised clustering approach proposed in the 
thesis to generate highly accurate clusters, it is still expected to produce some 
noises, i.e., mislabelled flows. Therefore the critical issue to investigate is then 
noise tolerance signature learning.  
Also, we are looking to extend the approaches in the thesis to other related 
areas, such as webpage classification and clustering, user and information clas-
sification in online social networks.   
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APPENDIX 
8 GMM WITH EQUIVALENCE 
SETS 
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In this part, we present the complete calculation process of the expected val-
ue of the complete-data log-likelihood for the Gaussian mixtures with equiva-
lence sets [110], which is given by equation (5-6).  
 𝑄(𝜽, 𝜽𝑔) = ∑log 𝑝(𝑋,𝒚|𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽) 𝑃 (𝒚|𝑋, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔)𝒚  (A-1) 
In equation (A-1), 𝜽𝑔 is the current parameter estimate, 𝜽 is the new param-
eters to be optimized, and Ω = {𝑌 ∣(𝑦1𝑖 = ⋯ = 𝑦𝑁𝑖𝑖 ), 𝑖 = 1, … , M} is the con-
strained space of values Y can take on.  
 
Complete-data likelihood 
We first compute the complete-data likelihood part, i.e. the joint density 
𝑝(𝑋,𝒚|𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽): 
 
𝑝(𝑋, 𝑦|𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃) = 𝑝(𝑋|𝑦, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃)𝑃(𝑦|𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃) 
= ∏ 𝑝(𝑋𝑠|𝑦𝑠, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃)
𝑀
𝑠=1
𝑃 (𝑦|𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃) (A-2) 
In particular, 𝑃(𝒚|𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽) could be written as the following using the Bayes 
rule and data independence: 
 
𝑃(𝑦|𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃) = 𝑃(𝑦 ∈ Ω|𝑦, 𝜃)𝑃(𝑦|𝜃)𝑃 (𝑦 ∈ Ω|𝜃)  
= ∏ 𝛿𝑦𝑠𝑃(𝑦𝑠|𝜃)
𝑀
𝑠=1
∑ …∑ ∏ 𝛿𝑦𝑗𝑃(𝑦𝑗∣𝜃)𝑀𝑗=1𝑦𝑀𝑦1
 
(A-3) 
where 
 𝛿𝑦𝑠 = {1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1
𝑠 = ⋯ = 𝑦𝑁𝑠𝑠0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒             (A-4) 
 
Let Z denotes 𝑃(𝒚 ∈ Ω|𝜽), that is:  
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 𝑍 ≡ 𝑃(𝑦 ∈ Ω|𝜃) = ∑ …∑ ∏ 𝛿𝑦𝑗𝑃(𝑦𝑗∣𝜃)𝑀𝑗=1𝑦𝑀𝑦1  (A-5) 
Then the complete-data log-likelihood becomes: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝(𝑋, 𝑦|𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃)
= ∑𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝(𝑋𝑠|𝑦𝑠, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃)
𝑀
𝑠=1
+ ∑𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃(𝑦𝑠|𝜃)
𝑀
𝑠=1
+ ∑𝛿𝑦𝑠
𝑀
𝑠=1
− 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑍 
(A-6) 
 
Marginal probability distribution 
Next we compute the marginal probability distribution for the hidden data 
𝑃(𝒚|𝑋, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔): 
 
𝑃(𝑦|𝑋, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃𝑔) = 𝑃(𝑦 ∈ Ω|𝑋, 𝑦, 𝜃𝑔)𝑃(𝑦|𝑋, 𝜃𝑔)𝑃 (𝑦 ∈ Ω|𝑋, 𝜃𝑔)  
= 𝑃(𝑦 ∈ Ω|𝑋, 𝑦, 𝜃𝑔)𝑃(𝑦|𝑋, 𝜃𝑔)∑ 𝑃(𝑦 ∈ Ω|𝑋, 𝑦, 𝜃𝑔)𝑃 (𝑦|𝑋, 𝜃𝑔)𝑦  
(A-7) 
The probability of the constraints can be obtained by: 
 𝑃(𝑦 ∈ Ω|𝑋, 𝑦, 𝜃𝑔) = ∏ 𝛿𝑦𝑠
𝑀
𝑠=1
 (A-8) 
and posterior probability can be calculated as the following according to data 
independence:  
 𝑃(𝑦|𝑋, 𝜃𝑔) = ∏ 𝑃(𝑦𝑠|𝑋𝑠, 𝜃𝑔)
𝑀
𝑠=1
 (A-9) 
Therefore we can rewrite equation (A-7) as: 
 𝑃(𝑦|𝑋, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃𝑔) = ∏ 𝛿𝑦𝑠𝑃(𝑦𝑠|𝑋𝑠, 𝜃
𝑔)𝑀𝑠=1
∑ …∑ ∏ 𝛿𝑦𝑗𝑃(𝑦𝑗∣𝑋𝑗, 𝜃𝑔)𝑀𝑗=1𝑦𝑀𝑦1
 (A-10) 
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Expectation of complete-data log-likelihood 
Based on equation (A-6) and (A-10), we can obtain the following expression 
for the expectation of the complete-data log-likelihood in equation (A-1): 
 
𝑄(𝜃, 𝜃𝑔) = ∑∑𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑠, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃𝑔)∑𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑙(𝑥𝑛𝑠 |𝜃𝑙)
𝑁𝑠
𝑛=1
𝐾
𝑙=1
𝑀
𝑠=1
+ ∑∑𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑠, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃𝑔)𝑁𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑎𝑙
𝐾
𝑙=1
𝑀
𝑠=1
− ∑𝑙𝑜𝑔 ∑(𝑎𝑙)𝑁𝑠
𝐾
𝑙=1
𝑀
𝑠=1
 
(A-11) 
where the posterior probability is defined as: 
 
𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑠, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃𝑔) ≡ 𝑃(𝑦1𝑠 = 𝑙, … , 𝑦𝑁𝑠𝑠 = 𝑙∣𝑋𝑠, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃𝑔) 
= ∏ [𝑎𝑙
𝑔𝑝𝑙(𝑥𝑛𝑠 |𝜃𝑙𝑔)]𝑁𝑠𝑛=1
∑ ∏ [𝑎𝑗𝑔𝑝𝑗(𝑥𝑛𝑠 ∣𝜃𝑗𝑔)]𝑁𝑠𝑛=1𝐾𝑗=1
 
(A-12) 
In order to maximize 𝑄(𝜽, 𝜽𝑔), we can take its derivatives with respect to 
the parameters. 
 
Maximum-likelihood estimates of Gaussian parameters 
We consider the Gaussian parameters first. Recall that each component den-
sity is normal and is specified by the mean and the covariance matrix, that is: 
 𝑝𝑖(𝑥|𝜃𝑖) = 𝜙(𝑥|𝜇𝑖, 𝛴𝑖) = |𝛴𝑖|
−1 2⁄
(2𝜋)𝑑 2⁄ 𝑒−
12(𝑥−𝜇𝑖)𝑇𝛴𝑖−1(𝑥−𝜇𝑖) (A-13) 
Thus the posterior probability 𝑃(𝑖|𝑋𝑠, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔) can be calculated as ex-
pression (5-10).  
By taking the logarithm of expression (A-13) and ignoring those constant 
terms (which will be gone after taking derivatives), and substituting into the 
first part on the right side of equation (A-11), we have:  
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∑∑𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑠, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃𝑔)∑𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑙(𝑥𝑛𝑠 |𝜃𝑙)
𝑁𝑠
𝑛=1
𝐾
𝑙=1
𝑀
𝑠=1
= ∑∑𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑠, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃𝑔)∑[− 12 𝑙𝑜𝑔(|𝛴𝑙|)
𝑁𝑠
𝑛=1
𝐾
𝑙=1
𝑀
𝑠=1
− 12 (𝑥𝑛𝑠 − 𝜇𝑙)𝑇 𝛴𝑙−1(𝑥𝑛𝑠 − 𝜇𝑙)] 
(A-14) 
Taking the derivative of (A-14) with respect to 𝝁𝒊 and setting it equal to ze-
ro, we get: 
 ∑𝑃(𝑖|𝑋𝑠, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃𝑔)∑𝛴𝑖−1(𝑥𝑛𝑠 − 𝜇𝑖)
𝑁𝑠
𝑛=1
𝑀
𝑠=1
= 0 (A-15) 
from which we can easily obtain:  
 𝜇𝑖 = ∑ 𝑃(𝑖|𝑋𝑠, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃
𝑔) ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑠𝑁𝑠𝑛=1𝑀𝑠=1
∑ 𝑃(𝑖|𝑋𝑠, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃𝑔) 𝑁𝑠𝑀𝑠=1
 (A-16) 
Similarly, by taking the derivative of expression (A-14) with respect to 𝜮𝑖−1 
and setting it equal to zero, we can have: 
 ∑𝑃(𝑖|𝑋𝑠, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔)∑[𝜮𝑖 − (𝒙𝑛𝑠 − 𝝁𝑖)(𝒙𝑛𝑠 − 𝝁𝑖)𝑇 ]
𝑁𝑠
𝑛=1
𝑀
𝑠=1
= 0 (A-17) 
from which we can obtain: 
 𝛴𝑖 = ∑ 𝑃(𝑖|𝑋𝑠, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃
𝑔) ∑ (𝑥𝑛𝑠 − 𝜇𝑖)(𝑥𝑛𝑠 − 𝜇𝑖)𝑇𝑁𝑠𝑛=1𝑀𝑠=1
∑ 𝑃(𝑖|𝑋𝑠, 𝑦 ∈ Ω, 𝜃𝑔) 𝑁𝑠𝑀𝑠=1
 (A-18) 
 
Estimating mixing probabilities 
Now we consider the mixing probabilities. The derivative of 𝑄(𝜽, 𝜽𝑔) with 
respect to them can be derived from equation (A-11) as: 
 
𝜕𝑄(𝜽, 𝜽𝑔)
𝜕𝑎𝑖 = ∑
𝑃(𝑙|𝑋𝑠, 𝒚 ∈ Ω, 𝜽𝑔)𝑁𝑠𝑎𝑖
𝑀
𝑠=1
− ∑ 𝑁𝑠(𝑎𝑙)𝑁𝑠−1∑ (𝑎𝑙)𝑁𝑠𝐾𝑙=1
𝑀
𝑠=1
 (A-19) 
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in which the last term persists such that there is no close-form solution for the 
mixing probabilities.  
This problem has been investigated in the research of machine learning. In 
order to have a close-form solution, Shental et al. [110] suggested a different 
probability model for data generation, where firstly a source component is 
sampled independently for each equivalence set (referred to as chunklet) ac-
cording to the mixing probabilities and then the data points in the set are 
sampled independently from the component density. In essence, the model 
treats the equivalence sets as single data points weighted by the number of 
points in them. The authors also incorporated negative equivalence constraints 
(which specify that two samples cannot be put in the same cluster) in their 
model. In this case, there is no analytical solution as well and the authors re-
sorted to some approximations.  
In the context of network traffic clustering, the original mixture model for 
data generation (that is the data points are sampled independently according 
to the mixture density) is more reasonable. Because the observed traffic aggre-
gates are generated by a large number of individual Internet users and the 
equivalence information is discovered afterwards based on some domain 
knowledge. Also, we have not made use of any negative equivalence infor-
mation because we cannot obtain such information in the unlabelled traffic 
data for certain. The evaluations given in Chapter 5.5.2 have shown that using 
solely positive equivalence constraints and the SBCK approximation improves 
the traffic clustering procedure in terms of both accuracy and run-time per-
formance. 
 i 
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